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I.

Introduction
It is common knowledge in the tax field that, if a taxpayer

is reimbursed for an expenditure or loss, there is no difference in
the federal income tax2 consequences whether either the
reimbursement is excluded from the taxpayer’s gross income and
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no deduction is allowed for the expenditure or loss, or instead a
full deduction3 is allowed for the expenditure or loss and the
reimbursement is included in the taxpayer’s gross income.4 To
illustrate,

consider

the

circumstances

of

an

employer’s

reimbursement of an employee’s business expense.
G expends $2,000 for travel expenses for a business trip
that G made on behalf of her employer. In the same year, the
employer reimburses G for the $2,000 expense. Apart from this
expenditure and the reimbursement, G had taxable income of
$35,000 that year. If G is allowed a full deduction for the $2,000
she spent and is required to include the reimbursement in her gross
income, she will still have $35,000 in taxable income.5 If, instead,
the reimbursement is excluded from G’s gross income and no
deduction is allowed for her payment of the travel expenses, she
will also have taxable income of $35,000. So, on its face, it would
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In general, the deduction must be a nonitemized deduction to be
fully deductible. An itemized deduction is subject to limitations so
that all or part of the item may not be deductible. See Jeffrey H.
Kahn, Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for Structural
Change in Tax Deduction Classification, 80 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8
(2005).
4
See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, The Taxation of Tax Idemnity
Payments: Recovery of Capital and The Contours of Gross
Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 381, 386-87 (1991) (“Not allowing a
deduction for a loss, but treating a recovery of the loss in a later
year as a return of capital, yields the same result – no net income –
as allowing a deduction for the loss and taxing the recovery.”).
5
The $2,000 deduction for the expenditure will wash out the
$2,000 income from the reimbursement, and so the taxpayer will
be left with the $35,000 of taxable income.
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appear that, for income tax purposes, the exclusion of the
reimbursement is identical to allowing a deduction for the
expenditure.6 Indeed, it is because of that identity that the Internal
Revenue Service (the Service) permits an employee simply to
exclude a reimbursement for a deductible employee expense rather
than to include the reimbursement and take a deduction for the
expenditure.7
While there is no difference in tax consequences for an
exclusion or deduction when the expenditure or loss is reimbursed,
there is a significant difference if no deduction is allowed and the
taxpayer is not fully reimbursed. There are numerous provisions in
the Internal Revenue Code8 (the Code) where a reimbursement of
an expenditure or loss is excluded from income even though no
deduction is allowable to the taxpayer for the portion of an
6

Of course, the taxpayer’s gross income will be greater if a
deduction is chosen instead of an exclusion. But, the taxpayer’s
taxable income, which is the figure to which tax rates are applied,
will be identical in either case. The size of a taxpayer’s gross
income is not irrelevant, but it is significant in only a limited
number of circumstances. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 543(b)(2). Also, if the
reimbursement is received in a year after the expenditure, the tax
consequence of a deduction for the latter or an exclusion of the
former will depend upon the taxpayer’s marginal tax bracket in
each year. But if we ignore tax rate differentials, the deduction and
the income items are equal and so net out to zero. Any difference
in tax brackets is random and will sometimes favor the taxpayer
and sometimes favor the government.
7
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(b)(1). To qualify for exclusion, the
employee must have been required to provide the employer with an
accounting of the expenses and done so. Id.
8
References herein to the Internal Revenue Code (“Code” or
“I.R.C.”) are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
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expenditure or loss that is not reimbursed. Since the exclusion and
deduction approaches generally are identical for tax purposes, one
might expect there to be parallel treatment of reimbursed and
unreimbursed expenditures and losses. That is, one might expect a
taxpayer who incurs an expenditure or loss to be treated the same
by the tax law whether the item is reimbursed or not. Yet, there are
many cases in which that is not so. The disparate treatment of
reimbursed and unreimbursed taxpayers in those cases seems
inequitable to some who believe that either deductions should be
allowed for unreimbursed items or, if not, no exclusion should be
allowed for the receipt of a reimbursement.9 While not all
commentators have urged that parallelism should be the rule, the
question of whether to adopt parallel treatment in specific
circumstances is frequently discussed in tax courses.10
If the tax law were both to exclude from income the receipt
of a recovery or reimbursement for a loss or expenditure and also
to allow an unrestricted deduction to a taxpayer who incurred the
same type of loss or expenditure but who was not reimbursed, the
author would describe that approach as “parallel” treatment. By
9

See, e.g., KLEIN, BANKMAN & SHAVIRO, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION at pp. 123, 141 (13th ed. 2003); KLEIN, BANKMAN &
SHAVIRO, TEACHER’S MANUAL – FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 56
(13th ed. 2003); SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 490 (2004) (“There is no obvious policy justification
for this general disfavoring of deductions relative to exclusions.”).
Contra, Sophie Hudson CITE; and Zelenak, supra note 4, at 387.
10
Id.
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“parallel” treatment, the author means that similar, but not
necessarily identical, situations are given the same tax treatment. If
such situations are treated differently by the tax law, the author
refers to that approach as “nonparallel” treatment. Nonparallel
treatment results in disparate tax treatment of taxpayers who
occupy similar positions, and that difference violates the principle
of horizontal equity.11 Nonparallel treatment is then one type of
violation of the principle of horizontal equity.

Consider the

following illustration of nonparallel treatment by the Code.
Code

section

104(a)(2)

excludes

from

income

compensatory damages received by a taxpayer on account of a
physical injury.12 In essence, as shown above, this exclusion is the
same, for tax purposes, as requiring the taxpayer to include the
damage payment in income but also providing a matching full
deduction for the amount of the damages.13 Thus, the Code

11

The meaning of “horizontal equity” is explained at infra note

15.
12
One exception to that exclusion is that a reimbursement of
medical expenses that were previously deducted by the injured
party are included in the latter’s income. I.R.C. § 104(a).
13
For the deduction to be an exact equivalent to an exclusion of
the payment, the deduction would have to be allowable in the same
year that the injured taxpayer received the payment from the
tortfeasor, and that will not usually be the case. But, the principal
significance of there being a different time sequence is that the
marginal rates for the deduction and the income may differ because
they fall in different tax years; and that difference in marginal rates
can be ignored because it will have a random effect. See supra note
6. While the difference in time also raises a “time value” issue, the
amount of time value money likely will be small.
5

provides the equivalent of a deduction for a loss based on a
physical injury for which compensation is received. That suggests
that, in order to have parallel treatment, taxpayers should be
allowed a deduction for a loss resulting from an uncompensated
physical injury.
No such deduction currently exists, and so the Code does
not adopt parallel treatment in this circumstance. That is, the Code
effectively provides a deduction for the taxpayer who happens to
be compensated for a physical injury,14 but provides no
corresponding relief for a taxpayer who is not compensated. This
lack of parallelism also results in a contravention of the principle
of horizontal equity.15 Assume A and B are injured in separate car

14

As noted, the exclusion from income is equivalent to allowing a
deduction for the loss.
15
Horizontal equity requires that persons in like net income
positions pay the same amount of income tax. Douglas Kahn,
Accelerated Depreciation – Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance
for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 n.5 (1979). The
goal of differently taxing individuals with disparate net income is
referred to as vertical equity. WILLIAM ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 7-8 (5th ed. 1999). The goal of vertical equity
generally includes a requirement that there be an “appropriate”
difference in taxation. See Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti,
Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange,
1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 607 (1993). Many people disagree about
what type of difference is appropriate.
Horizontal and vertical equity are two aspects of the same
principle. See id. at 612 and Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal
Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191, 195 (1992). Contra Richard A.
Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV.
354 (1993) (contending that horizontal equity has independent
significance that is distinct from vertical equity). While, for
6

accidents and sustain similar physical injuries that are valued at the
same amount.16 A’s injuries were caused by a wealthy individual
and A is compensated one million dollars for the damages caused
by the accident. B is struck by an individual with limited means
and is not able to recover any damages for his injuries. Assume
that, other than the damage recovery, A and B have the same
amount of taxable income.
Since A’s injury was physical, A is able to exclude the one
million dollars recovery from income under Code section 104(a)(2)
and therefore is not taxed on that amount. A and B are treated as
having equal income for tax purposes and will pay the same
amount of income tax. By providing A an exclusion (the
equivalent of allowing A a deduction for the injury) and denying a
deduction to B, the tax system has violated horizontal equity since
A and B are taxed the same amount even though A has received
one million dollars more in that year than B.17 Putting it
differently, A effectively is allowed a deduction for his injury
(offsetting the compensation received), while B is denied a
convenience, this article refers only to horizontal equity, it applies
equally to vertical equity.
16
There are serious administrative difficulties in determining the
value of an uncompensated physical injury, the presence of which
is itself one of the reasons for not allowing a deduction for those
losses.
17
As noted, this assumes that A and B are equals for purposes of
income comparisons. Also note that while nonparallel treatment
will contravene the principle of horizontal equity, it is only one of
the ways in which equity can be violated.
7

deduction for a virtually identical (but uncompensated) injury. As
we shall see later in this article, while horizontal equity can be
obtained by allowing a full deduction for such losses, that remedy
contravenes other policies. Horizontal and vertical equity, as is true
for parallelism, are merely one of the myriad goals of a good tax
system and so must give way when weightier considerations point
in a different direction.18 The treatment of personal injury damages
is discussed in Part IV B in this article.
The principal issue that this article addresses is whether
parallelism should be a compelling goal of the tax system. That
question arises in connection with numerous Code provisions, of
which the treatment of physical damages is merely one example.
The issue of whether to adopt parallelism obviously arises
whenever the Code allows an exclusion for a reimbursement or
recovery of a nondeductible item, but it also arises when there are
limitations on the amount of deduction allowable that do not apply
if the item is reimbursed or otherwise recovered.19

18

Some commentators contend that horizontal and vertical equity
have no independent significance. See Kaplow, supra note 15 and
McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 15.
19
While the lack of parallelism exists just as much when the
amount of deduction allowable is limited to less than the full
amount of the expenditure or loss, the commentary objecting to
nonparallel treatment has focused primarily on cases where no
deduction is allowable. Nonparallelism can also arise in other
circumstances. For example, Professors Dodge and Soled state that
the nonrecognition granted by Code § 1031 for exchanges of
certain like-kind property is contrary to tax policy because a sale of
8

It is the thesis of this article that there can be different
considerations applicable to reimbursed expenditures and losses
than apply to unreimbursed items. There may be compelling
reasons for excluding a reimbursement from income that do not
apply to the determination of whether to allow a deduction for
unreimbursed items. And, there can be compelling reasons to deny
a deduction for an unreimbursed item that do not apply to the
treatment of reimbursements.20 In other words, the apparent
equivalence of the deduction and exclusion is deceptive because
different policy considerations can apply to each. So, the crucial
question in such cases is whether the goal of parallel treatment is
sufficiently strong to outweigh the other considerations.
This analysis has led the author to conclude that parallel
treatment not only is not compelled, it is not always desirable
because of countervailing considerations that weigh more heavily.
Each instance of nonparallel treatment must be examined to
determine whether the contravention of parallelism is warranted.21

such property immediately followed by a reinvestment is a taxable
transaction. Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the
Basis Myth Under the Income Tax, FSU College of Law Public
Law Research Paper No. 149; FSU College of Law-Econ Research
Paper No. 05-17 (available at ssrn.com/abstract=681578). The
disparity of treatment noted by Professors Dodge and Soled is
similar to the nonparallelism that is examined in this article, but
does not fall within the definition of nonparallelism as used herein.
20
See Zelenak, supra note 4, at 387.
21
See Hudson, supra note 9, at __. If you determine that there is no
merit to allowing an exclusion, then obviously that exclusion
9

This article will examine a number of provisions where the Code
fails to provide parallel treatment for exclusions and deductions,
including some in which no deduction is allowable for
unreimbursed items and some where deductions are allowable but
are subject to limitations. In each case, the relevant considerations
will be examined.22
II.

Horizontal Equity – The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange
The principle of horizontal equity23 typically will not

resolve a question as to what tax treatment is proper for a specific
circumstance because its application rests on a determination that
parties are in equal positions; and the determination of equality
rests on a choice of the contact points that are to be compared,
about which reasonable people can disagree and often do so. For
individual income tax purposes, equality refers to income, and thus
income is the item on which individuals are to be compared; but

should be repealed. However, the reason for that repeal would be
to eliminate an unwarranted tax benefit rather than to obtain
parallel treatment even though one consequence of the repeal
would be the elimination of the nonparallelism that existed.
22
This article addresses only a small number of instances of
nonparallelism to illustrate the type of analysis that is required.
There are numerous nonparallel provisions that are not discussed
herein. For example, most of the employee fringe benefits that are
excluded from an employee’s income would not be deductible if
paid by the employee or by a self-employed individual. Also, the
deferral provided for employee retirement plans is more extensive
than that provided for the self-employed. Each of those
nonparallelisms should be examined in the same manner that is
applied to the ones discussed herein.
23
See supra note 15.
10

there is not universal agreement as to what items are to be taken
into account to determine a person’s income.24
Some commentators have concluded that horizontal equity
is not a useful concept for determining whether a provision is good
or bad because the horizontal equity concept rests on a choice of
what the proper measurement of income should be.25 Even if one
concurred with that view, horizontal equity might be seen as a
surrogate for “basic economic or justice decisions”26 or as a signal
that a problem exists. In other words, the fact that two persons who
appear to be in similar income circumstances are taxed differently
suggests that there may be a flaw somewhere in the tax system. By
contrast, Professors McDaniel and Repetti rejected that view and
concluded that the concept of horizontal equity not only does not
aid in uncovering tax problems, but can actually conceal problems
and lead policymakers astray because it places an obstacle between
the policymaker and the actual problem.27 The two professors
contend that it is better to go directly to the underlying problem
than to focus on the fact that a flaw in the tax system has caused
some persons to be treated inequitably. In an important sense,
while the author does not agree with many of the conclusions that

24

See e.g., Kahn, supra note 15.
Kaplow, supra note 15 and McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 15.
Contra, Musgrave supra note 15.
26
McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 15, at 619.
27
Id. at 622.
25

11

the two professors reached, the thesis and analysis of this article
conforms to the policy that Professors McDaniel and Repetti
advocate. The focus of this piece is on the difference in tax
treatment of what appear to be very similar items rather than on the
inequitable consequence of that treatment; and so the analysis set
forth herein directly addresses the underlying problem.
Whatever may be the merits of the conflicting views on the
role of horizontal equity, the parallelism concept, which is the
focus of this article, is not subject to those objections. If two
persons receive different tax treatment for the same type of
expenditure, which is what the author refers to as nonparallel
treatment, that disparate treatment raises serious issues of propriety
whether or not those issues are classified as violations of horizontal
equity. Regardless of the name given to this problem, it is a goal of
the tax system to avoid its occurrence. The establishment of equal
treatment of the same items not only serves the normative goal of
“fairness;” it also provides the taxpaying public with confidence
that they are being treated fairly; and that perception is as
important as the reality. Fairness of treatment then is a normative
value on which the parallelism concept is based. The word
“parallelism” was chosen by the author to designate that goal
because it is useful to have a common term to refer to it.

12

Professor Musgrave stated that almost everyone agrees
with the principle that people in equal positions should be given
equal treatment.28 Professors Kaplow, McDaniel and Repetti, while
disagreeing with Professor Musgrave’s thesis, do not reject that
statement. Rather, they question the utility of the concept of
equality because of the difficulty in determining the proper items
of comparison.29 But, for purposes of an income tax, there is no
dispute that income is the proper measure for comparisons; and
when the items to be compared are indistinguishable, there is no
need to refer to or resolve questions of what constitutes income.
Putting aside the question of the significance of the
horizontal and vertical equity concepts, let us now focus on
parallelism. Clearly, parallelism (i.e., equal treatment of similar
items) must be taken into account in evaluating some provisions.
To take it into account, however, does not mean that it must prevail
over other legitimate goals of the tax system with which it is in
conflict. As will be shown later in this article, the principle of

28

Musgrave, supra note 15, at 355.
On the issue of whether “equality” has any meaning in the
administrative of justice, Compare Peter Weston, The Empty Idea
of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) with Erwin
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor
Weston, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); Anthony D’Amato,
Comment: Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600
(1983); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV.
245 (1983); Kenneth W. Simons, Equality As a Comparative
Right, 65 B.U.L. REV. 387 (1985). See also McDaniel & Repetti,
supra note 15, at 612, n. 28.
29
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parallelism is merely one factor to be considered and does not
unilaterally provide a definitive answer as to whether a tax
provision should be retained. However, merely because a principle
is not sufficient by itself to determine a result does not mean that it
is a nullity.
Parallelism is related to the horizontal equity principle in
that nonparallel treatment will result in unequal treatment of some
persons.

While this article focuses on parallelism, all that is

written herein also applies to the broader principle of horizontal
equity. For those few who consider horizontal equality to be
irrelevant, the application of this article’s reasoning to that
principle is of no consequence; but many persons do give weight to
horizontal equity; and even those who do not frown on unequal
treatment of the same item.
III.

The Beguiling Attractiveness of Parallelism
It is easy to see why many find the concept of parallelism

so attractive. Parallelism requires that taxpayers with the same loss
or expenditure be treated the same. Lack of parallelism
instinctively appears to be unfair. Indeed, there is a perverseness in
the tax law’s more favorable treatment of the reimbursed party
than is provided to the one who is not compensated for his loss or
expenditure since the latter is more deserving of sympathy. In the
example above concerning the physical injuries suffered by A and

14

B, why does A receive what amounts to a deduction for his loss but
B does not? Both A and B suffer the same type and dollar amount
of loss but the tax system treats them differently by effectively
allowing A a deduction but denying any deduction to B even
though A clearly is the better off of the two.
As noted above, a failure to provide parallel treatment
violates the frequently cited goal of horizontal equity. In our
example, A and B will be taxed the same despite the large
difference in their income. Horizontal equity can be achieved only
if A and B are given parallel treatment, either by providing a
deduction to both or by denying a deduction to both.
However, upon a more careful review, it becomes clear that
parallelism is not always the optimum result. To illustrate, consider
the case of a refunded income tax payment.30 X pays a federal
income tax of $23,000 for the year 2000. None of that payment is
deductible.31 In the year 2003, it is determined that X should have
paid an income tax for 2000 of only $20,000. Accordingly, the
Service returns $3,000 to X. X is not required to include that
refund in income. The $3,000 refund is excluded from X’s gross
income because it is not an accession of wealth but instead a return

30

For a similar example involving a refunded fine, see Zelenak,
supra note 4, at 387. See also DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 246-50 (3rd ed.
2004).
31
I.R.C. § 275(a).
15

of the money erroneously paid to the government. As noted, the
effect of this exclusion is equivalent to allowing X a deduction for
the $3,000 overpayment in the year that he received the refund.32
Also, for the year 2000, Y paid a federal income tax of
$23,000. In the year 2005, it is discovered that Y should have paid
an income tax of only $20,000. Because the statute of limitations
for claiming a refund had expired, Y does not receive a refund for
his $3,000 overpayment of the year 2000 tax. Y is not allowed a
deduction for that unrefunded overpayment. But, X is allowed to
exclude the $3,000 refund he received. It is unlikely that the lack
of parallel treatment for X and Y will bother anyone even though
the tax favored party, X, is better off economically than is the
disfavored Y. It illustrates that each case must be judged on the
considerations that apply.
While the visceral reaction to the nonparellelism in the
above scenario is that it is appropriate, let us examine the treatment
more closely to see why that is so. Why should Y be denied a
deduction for the overpayment of his taxes? One answer is that a
deduction is allowed for a loss only if there are compelling reasons
for it. Losses incurred in a business or profit-seeking activity are

32

Another way to view this occurrence is to apply the transactional
approach and treat the refund as a retroactive reduction of the
payment that was previously made. This same approach can be
applied to other circumstances. One example is the discussion of
tax indemnity payments in Part IV C of this article.
16

generally deductible33 Personal losses are not deductible unless
they are the product of a theft or casualty.34 Y’s loss is not a
business or profit-oriented loss and is not a casualty or theft loss.
A second and even more compelling reason for denying a
deduction is that the qualification for such a deduction would turn
on a finding that the tax for the year 2000 was overpaid. The point
of having a statute of limitations is to prevent the necessity of
examining the correctness of returns for which the statutory period
has run. For the allowance of a deduction to have any meaning,
the prior return for the year 2000 would have to be kept open, and
that would frustrate the purpose of having a limitations period.
On the other hand, if the overpayment is refunded before
the statute of limitations has run, there is no policy that would be
frustrated by excluding the refund from the taxpayer’s gross
income. To the contrary, there is a policy reason to exclude the
refund and that policy would be contravened if it were taxed. The
refund is a return of the taxpayer’s money and there are strong
reasons not to tax someone on the recovery of his own money
because the taxpayer has not realized a gain in any meaningful

33

I.R.C. § 165(c)(1), (2).
I.R.C. § 165(c)(3). The rationale for allowing a deduction for
casualty and theft losses is discussed in Jeffrey Kahn, Personal
Deductions—An ‘Ideal’ or Just Another ‘Deal’?, 2002
M.S.U.D.C.L. Law Review 1, 37-40. See also infra text
accompanying notes 52-55.
34
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sense.35 The entire system of utilizing basis to determine gain36
rests on the notion that one should not be taxed on the recovery of
one’s own money.
In sum, there are strong policy reasons to deny a deduction
for an unrefunded overpayment of taxes; but, not only are there no
policy reasons to tax a refund, there are policy considerations that
require its exclusion. The critical question then is whether the goal
of parallel treatment is important enough to warrant either granting
a deduction for the unrefunded overpayment or, instead, taxing the
refund. In other words, does the goal of parallel treatment
outweigh either of the considerations discussed above? The
resolution of that question turns on value judgments. The author
believes that it is obvious that parallel treatment in this case is less
important than the considerations whose satisfaction results in
nonparallel treatment.
Let us examine one variation of the scenario set forth
above. Assume that in Y’s case, the Service voluntarily refunded
the overpayment even though the statute of limitations on refund
35

An exception to that policy occurs when the tax benefit rule
applies to a recovery because the taxpayer had previously taken a
deduction that provided him with a tax benefit. I.R.C. § 111. See
also DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY H. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 183-84 (5th ed. 2005). The reason for this exception is to
prevent the taxpayer from retaining a tax benefit for an expenditure
which he subsequently recovered. The policy of preventing a
taxpayer from retaining a deduction for which he is no longer
entitled outweighs the policy of not taxing a return of capital.
36
I.R.C. § 1001(a).
18

claims had run. Obviously, that is unrealistic,37 but let us consider
the tax consequences nevertheless.
In the author’s view, the refund should not be taxed. Since
the parties involved, who are at arms’ length, have concluded that
there was an overpayment, the Service should accept that
conclusion. It does not require a reexamination of the year 2000
tax return because the parties have reached an agreement. The fact
that one of the parties is the Service itself makes the case much
stronger, but the result should be the same if the payor were a third
party other than the Service.38 The only question that might arise
is whether the return of the funds is due to some reason other than
a determination that there was an overpayment –i.e., was this a
disguised compensation for some service or property? That issue
does not arise when the payor is the Service itself.
The above example is meant to illustrate the type of
analysis that is required when examining provisions that provide
nonparallel treatment. The next section of the article will examine
a number of specific Code provisions that produce nonparallel
results for taxpayers. In each case, the author will analyze whether
such

treatment

is

justified

after

examining

the

policies

underpinning the provisions.

37

See I.R.C. '' 6402(a), 6514, 7405.
For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra Part IV C
of the article.
38
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IV.

Selected Nonparallel Tax Provisions
A.

Damage to Property

If a taxpayer receives compensation for damaged property,
the taxpayer includes the recovery in income only to the extent that
it exceeds the basis of the property.39 For purpose of this rule, it
does not matter whether the payor is the person who damaged the
property or an insurer.40 As discussed in detail below, this
exclusion is in sharp contrast to the severe restrictions on the
amount of deduction allowable to a taxpayer who is not
compensated for the loss when the property in question was not
used for a business or profit-making purpose.
Prior to examining these conflicting treatments, it is useful
to review the tax treatment where a taxpayer voluntarily sells
personal use property. For example, X owns a personal use
automobile with a basis of $5,000. X sells the automobile to Y for
$8,000 cash, thereby realizing and recognizing a gain of $3,000.41
X is required to include the $3,000 gain that he recognizes in his
income. However, X pays no tax on the other $5,000 that X
receives from Y. The tax system treats the $5,000 cash as a
39

See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at 77-78; Raytheon
Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). In appropriate circumstances, a
taxpayer can defer all or part of the gain realized on an involuntary
conversion by investing in similar property within a specified time
period. I.R.C. § 1033.
40
See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at 77.
41
I.R.C. § 1011.
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nontaxable return of capital as measured by X’s basis in the
automobile.
What are the tax consequences to X if the automobile’s fair
market value is less than X’s basis? Assume X receives only
$3,000 cash from Y for his personal car. Now, X realizes and
recognizes a $2,000 loss on the transaction. Again, X pays no tax
on the return of capital, in this case the $3,000 cash. But what of
the $2,000 basis that X failed to recover? The current tax system
will not allow X any deduction for the $2,000 recognized loss
since the automobile was personal use, rather than business or
investment, property.42
What is the justification for not allowing X to deduct the
loss that he recognized in an arm’s length transaction with an
unrelated person? Basically, the loss is seen as an element of the
personal consumption of the asset. The decline in value of a
personal use asset that arises because of wear and tear, exhaustion
or obsolescence is not deductible because it is seen as a cost of the
personal use or consumption of the asset. That treatment is
consistent with the Haig-Simons definition of income.43 Even if the
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I.R.C. § 165.
The Haig-Simons definition of income is the most commonly
cited definition for tax policy purposes. It defines income for a
period as the sum of the increase in wealth accumulated by the
person plus the market value of the person’s personal consumption.
See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (Univ. of
Chi. Press 1980) (1938). Thus, in the above example, the system
43
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decline in the asset’s value is due to market factors – as contrasted
to wear and tear or exhaustion - that decline in value is seen as part
of the cost of owning the asset and so is seen as part of the cost of
personal consumption.
Professor Richard Epstein argued that such market decline
is not an element of consumption and therefore should be
deductible under our tax system.44 In order to distinguish between
personal consumption and market decline, Professor Epstein
suggested that taxpayers should be required to reduce their basis in
all depreciable assets (business, investment and personal use)
under a cost recovery system. While no deduction would be
allowable for the depreciation of personal use assets, a taxpayer
would still reduce his basis in that property to reflect the personal
consumption. Under such a system, the taxpayer would be allowed
a deduction for any loss recognized on a sale of a personal use
asset on the assumption that such loss was not due to consumption
by the taxpayer and therefore should be deductible as a true loss of
wealth under the Haig-Simons definition of income. As discussed
by Professor

Epstein, this proposed system would not always

denies a deduction to X because it assumes that the decline in
value of the automobile is due to the personal consumption or use
by X. As consumption is one element of income under HaigSimons, there should be no deduction for that use.
44
Richard A. Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of Personal
Property Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 STAN. L. REV. 454,
461 (1970).
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benefit taxpayers since it could cause recognition of gain, or a
greater amount of gain, when the item is sold for more than the
adjusted basis.45
One problem with Professor Epstein=s proposal is that it
imposes a significant administrative burden. It seems likely that
individuals generally are not equipped to deal with the effects of
depreciation on personal items even when it is deductible. For
example, when an individual sells a residence for which he had
been taking a deduction for the business use of part of that
property, unless the individual consults a tax expert, it seems
unlikely that, in reporting the tax consequences of the sale, the
individual will reflect the resulting reduction of basis and the
inapplicability of the Code section 121 exclusion of gain to the
portion of the property that was so used. It is doubtful that
individuals would do any better in reflecting a decline in basis for
exclusively personal use property. It is just a bit too complex a
system to expect average persons to understand it, much less to
recall it when the time arrives. But, let us put aside administrative
concerns and consider the merits of Professor Epstein=s proposal.
The treatment of gains and losses are examined separately.
First, let us examine the treatment of a gain under Professor
Epstein=s proposal. Assume the following facts in which the

45

Id.
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Epstein system has been adopted and Code section 121 has been
repealed. G purchased a residence on leased land for $100,000.
Assume that the nondeductible depreciation for the building is
$5,000 per year. After four years, G sold the residence for
$115,000, and G=s adjusted basis in the residence, under Professor
Epstein=s system, is $80,000. So, G has a gain of $35,000. Of that
gain, $15,000 is attributable to appreciation in value that took place
while G held the property. But, what of the remaining $20,000 of
gain? That is attributable to the reduction in basis caused by the
nondeductible depreciation. Would it be appropriate to tax G on
that $20,000 of gain?
The depreciation of G=s basis reflects the fact that the
amount expended by G to purchase the residence was used up (i.e.,
consumed) in the year for which the depreciation is charged.46 If
the tax law were to include in G=s income the imputed income
from his use of the residence, a deduction would then have to be
allowed for the depreciation of the property (i.e., the amount that G
paid for each year=s Aincome@ from the property would be allocated
to that Aincome@). Since imputed income from the use of property
is not taxed, no deduction is allowed for the portion of the
purchase price that is allocable to each year=s use. But, Professor
Epstein=s system would reduce the basis of the property to reflect
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See Kahn, supra note 15, at 13-14.
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that a portion of the purchase price was consumed by G and so
should not shelter the proceeds of the sale from being taxed. While
there is merit to that analysis, there are reasons to oppose the
application of that system to the recognition of gain.
The $20,000 of gain that G recognized is attributable to
nondeductible depreciation. It is possible to view that gain as a
Arecapture@ of the depreciation, and the current tax law generally
does so when the depreciation is deductible.47 Apart from the
Arecapture@ rules, the reduction of basis for depreciable property
can cause gain recognition on the disposition of the property.
Should the recapture of a nondeductible item be included in
income for the same reasons? In analogous circumstances, the tax
benefit rule and Code section 111 do not tax the recovery of a
deducted item when the deduction did not provide a tax benefit.48
While the tax benefit rule does not apply to prevent the reduction
of basis for depreciation that is an allowable deduction,49 it would
contravene the principles on which the tax benefit rests to tax the
recovery of nondeductible depreciation. While Code section 111
applies only to the recovery of a deduction that did not create a tax
47

See I.R.C. '' 1245 and 1250. For a contrary view of that gain,
see Kahn, supra note 15, at 46-53. In the case of real property that
has been held for more than one year, only the accelerated portion
of depreciation is subjected to the recapture rules.
48
See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 35, at 183-84.
49
I.R.C. ' 1016(a)(2) reduces basis for the amount of depreciation
deduction that was allowable to the taxpayer regardless of whether
it gave rise to a tax benefit.
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benefit, it would be perverse to tax the recovery of an item for
which no deduction was allowable when the recover of a deducted
item is not taxed if the deduction did not provide a tax benefit. The
policies that underlie the tax benefit rule support the exclusion of
gain generated by a reduction in basis for nondeductible
depreciation. On balance, the author finds the reasons for not
taxing such gain stronger than the reasons for doing so.
As to Professor Epstein=s proposal to allow a loss deduction
when the personal use asset is sold for less than its adjusted basis,
he is correct that the recognized loss reflects a decline in market
value, assuming that the depreciation schedule that is adopted
accurately reflects the taxpayer=s consumption. However, a decline
in market value can be seen as a form of consumption in that it is
part of the cost the taxpayer incurs to have and use the item. Later
in this article, the author discusses the limitations imposed by
Congress on the deduction allowable for a casualty or theft loss of
personal use property.50 In that discussion, the author notes that
there is reason to distinguish casualty and theft losses from a
decline in value due to market conditions; but even in the former
circumstance, Congress allows only a very restricted amount of
deduction.51 There is much less reason to allow any deduction for
a loss due to decline in market conditions, since that loss of value
50
51

See infra the text accompanying notes 55 to 62.
I.R.C. ' 165(h).
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is part of the cost of enjoying the use of the item. The author
concludes that, while Professor Epstein=s proposal is intriguing, it
is not a desirable reform.
Returning to the hypothetical, what should be the tax
consequence if, instead of a voluntary sale, X’s personal
automobile were damaged in an accident or stolen, and X received
no compensation for the loss? One reasonable approach is to treat
X’s loss as part of X’s consumption (i.e., personal use to the
exclusion of others) of the automobile, and so deny any deduction
for the loss – that is, “part of the cost of possessing an asset is the
risk that it might be damaged or stolen.”52 That approach would
provide X with the same tax treatment he would have received if
he had voluntarily sold the automobile for a loss.53
Instead, a different, but also reasonable, approach would
allow X to deduct a casualty or theft loss. A casualty or theft loss is
different from a loss on a voluntary sale in that it is sudden,
unexpected, and involuntarily forced on the taxpayer. The loss that
a taxpayer incurs from an accident or theft does not look like a
consumption of the item; to the contrary, it can be viewed as
depriving the taxpayer of the use or consumption of the asset. For
52

Kahn, supra note 34, at 37.
The Joint Committee of Taxation clearly takes this view of
casualty and theft losses as the deduction is listed in the tax
expenditure budget. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, ___
Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years
____ (Comm. Print __). See also Kahn, supra note 34, at 37.
53
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example, consider the plight of an employee who collects his pay
in cash and is promptly mugged by a thief who takes the cash. It is
difficult to view the employee as having consumed the stolen cash
in the ordinary sense of that term.54
Yet, a loss attributable to sudden and unexpected outside
forces does bear some similarity to a loss attributable to outside
forces that impacted negatively on the market value of an asset,
and no deduction is allowed for losses attributable to market
fluctuations. It would not be unreasonable to treat both of those
losses the same and deny a deduction for both. But, it also would
not be unreasonable to focus on the differences between market
fluctuation losses and casualty losses and make some tax
54

Without a casualty and theft deduction, the tax system would
treat the employee whose cash was stolen the same as another
employee with the same pay who is able to safely deposit his
earnings into the bank and spend it on whatever he chooses. As
noted by Professor Kaplow, the deduction will not put the two
taxpayers on equal footing ex ante. In order to do so, the
government would have to transfer funds to the employee in order
to compensate for the theft. Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as
Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions
and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 1485, 1492-93 (1991) (“If one wished to provide fully equal
treatment to these precasualty equals, it would be necessary to
make a transfer from the fortunate to the unfortunate that
compensated completely for the latter’s losses...To accomplish this
transfer through the tax system, instead, a 100% credit rather than
a deduction would be necessary, with taxes on each income class
raised sufficiently to cover the costs.”) However, contrary to
Professor Kaplow’s inference, the purpose of the deduction is not
to make the unfortunate employee whole, but instead is meant to
reflect the fact that because of the differences in their net wealth
position, the two taxpayers should not be taxed the same. The
deduction accomplishes that goal.
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allowance for the latter. Congress determined that the consumption
element of a casualty or theft loss was too significant to allow a
full deduction for it, but the nature of that type of loss did not
warrant ignoring it for tax purposes. So, Congress adopted a
middle ground. It allowed a deduction for casualty and theft losses
of personal use property, but it imposed severe limitations on the
amount that can be deducted. Indeed, the limitations are so severe
that most taxpayers who suffer such losses will not qualify for any
deduction at all.
Code section 165(c)(3) allows a deduction for “losses of
property not connected with a trade or business or a transaction
entered into for profit, if such losses arise from fire, storm,
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.”55 The taxpayer’s loss
is the lesser of the item’s decline in value or the taxpayer’s basis in
the item.56 These losses are sometimes referred to as “personal
casualty losses.”57 The limitations on those deductions include:
1. No deduction is allowable to the extent that the taxpayer
is reimbursed for the loss or has a reasonable prospect of
being reimbursed.58

55

A deduction for certain casualties was included in the first
income tax act of 1913. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIB, 38
Stat. 167.
56
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1).
57
I.R.C, § 165(h)(3)(B).
58
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2).
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2. For each casualty or theft, no deduction is allowable for
the first $100 of loss from each event.59 The excess amount
can be deducted without restrictions only to the extent that
the taxpayer has personal casualty gains60 that year. The
excess of a taxpayer’s personal casualty losses for a year
(minus the $100 floor) over the taxpayer’s personal
casualty gains for that year is sometimes referred to as the
“net personal casualty loss.”61 The restrictions on the
deduction of a net personal casualty loss are described
below.
3. A taxpayer’s net personal casualty loss is deductible only
to the extent that it exceeds 10 percent of the taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income.62 In addition, the deductible net
personal casualty loss (i.e., the amount in excess of 10
percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income) is
characterized as an itemized deduction (but not as a
miscellaneous itemized deduction) and is thereby subjected
to the limitations placed on that category of deductions.

59

I.R.C. § 165(h)(1).
“Personal casualty gains” are defined as any “recognized gain
from any involuntary conversion of property….arising from fire,
storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.” I.R.C. §
165(h)(3)(A).
61
I.R.C. § 165(h)(2) uses the term “net casualty loss,” but the
author has chosen to use “net personal casualty loss” for greater
clarity.
62
I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A).
60
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Returning to the situation that began this discussion in
which a taxpayer receives compensation for damaged property, the
same considerations that apply to a voluntary sale apply here as
well. It is appropriate that Congress excludes from income the
amount of the compensation that does not exceed the taxpayer’s
basis in the damaged property since that amount is properly
characterized as a return of capital. This exclusion conforms to the
well established principle that a return of one’s capital is not
taxable. The damages received are not income to the extent of the
taxpayer’s basis because the dollars received are treated as a
replacement of the dollars the taxpayer is deemed to have invested
in the property that were lost due to the casualty or theft. Since the
cash reimbursement effectively constitutes a withdrawal by the
taxpayer of that amount of his investment in the property, the
taxpayer’s basis is reduced accordingly.63 That reduction does not
constitute a deferral of income because the value of the property
has correspondingly declined.
If the taxpayer collects insurance for the damaged or stolen
property pursuant to an insurance contract, instead of receiving a
payment from the wrongdoer, the insurance proceeds are not
included in income to the extent of the taxpayer’s basis unless the
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See Rev. Rul. 71-161, 1971-1 C.B. 76.
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taxpayer had previously taken a deduction for that loss.64 Insurance
proceeds are received pursuant to a contract for reimbursement of a
loss, and are not income to the extent they merely replace the lost
investment in the damaged or stolen property. Since the insurance
proceeds provide the taxpayer with cash in hand in place of part or
all of his investment in the property, the taxpayer’s basis in the
property is reduced accordingly.
It is true that there is a superficial equivalence between
excluding the taxpayer’s recovery and allowing a full deduction for
the loss – a deduction that is not allowed to unreimbursed
taxpayers who are subject to severe restrictions on deductibility.65
However, as already noted, the policy of excluding returns of
capital is entrenched in the tax system, and the conflicting
principle of parallelism is not strong enough to outweigh that
policy. Similarly, in the view of Congress, the reason for denying a
full deduction to a casualty or theft loss because of its points of
64

In their casebook, Professors Dodge, Fleming and Geier note
that the receipt of insurance proceeds raises some different
considerations from those that apply to a tortfeasor’s payments.
Nevertheless, they agree that the amount that does not exceed basis
should be excluded, and the author concurs. See DODGE, FLEMING
& GEIER, supra note 30, at 251-53.
65
A possible justification for imposing a limitation on the
deduction of such losses is a concern over the genuineness and
extent of the claimed loss. The author gives little credence to that
suggestion because limitations are a poor vehicle for dealing with
that concern – that is, the limitations are overinclusive in that they
also apply to genuine losses and are underinclusive in that they
allow a deduction for an improper claim to the extent that they
exceed the statutory limits.
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contact with personal consumption outweigh the principle of
parallelism, and so the latter principle is not strong enough to
justify allowing a full deduction. One might disagree with the
weight given by Congress to those conflicting principles in
choosing between them, but the author does not see how the
Congressional choice can be seen to be unreasonable. To the
contrary, although it is a difficult issue, the author deems the
Congressional solution to be a valid compromise between two
polar positions.66
B.

Physical Injury

Returning now to the tax law’s nonparallel treatment of
taxpayers who suffer physical injuries that was noted earlier in this
article, you will recall that compensatory damages received for a
physical injury generally are excluded from the income of the
injured party by Code section 104(a)(2), but no deduction is
allowed an injured party for uncompensated personal injuries.67 Is
there a justification for that treatment?
Initially, one might inquire as to what reasons there might
be for excluding compensatory damages for physical injuries from
income. A person typically has no basis (i.e., no dollar investment)
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The author finds the case for some deduction stronger for loss of
property due to theft then for casualty losses. See Kahn, supra note
34, at 37-40.
67
If the injured party incurred medical expenses, that amount can
be deductible subject to restrictions. I.R.C. § 213.
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in his bodily parts68; and so, if the same treatment that applies to
compensation received for damage to or loss of personal use
property were adopted, the entire amount of the compensation
received for a physical injury would be included in income.
Congress has never stated its reasons for providing an exclusion
for physical injury damages even though that exclusion has been in
the statutory tax law in one form or another since 191969 and has
undergone Congressional modifications from time to time.70
Commentators have speculated as to the likely reasons for that
exclusion, and the author has adopted the following rationales that
appear the most persuasive.71

68

Moreover, a taxpayer has the burden of establishing his basis
and it is doubtful that many persons could satisfy that burden of
proof in the case of human capital. In the unlikely event that a
taxpayer could prove that he had some basis in his human capital,
but could not show the exact amount, the taxpayer might be
allowed a basis; but, even then, the amount likely would be
minimal after making all assumptions in favor of the government –
an application of the so-called “Cohan rule.” See Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); Estate of Goldstein v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1032, 1037-38 (1960).
69
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. 65-254, section 213(b)(6), 40 Stat.
1057, 1066 (1919). The early history of the statutory exclusion has
been set forth in several articles. See, e.g., Margaret Henning,
Recent Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and
Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAX LAW. 783, 784-95 (1992).
70
In its most recent amendment in 1996, Congress limited the
exclusion to compensatory damages for physical injuries and made
clear that punitive damages are taxable. Small Business Protection
Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, section 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838
(1996)
71
The rationales adopted in this article was propounded in Douglas
Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury:
To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 348-356 (1995).
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The loss suffered from a physical injury is sometimes
referred to as a loss of “human capital.” The physical attribute that
was lost (e.g., a damaged or severed limb, a loss of sight or
hearing) is not something that the victim normally would sell in a
commercial market. In the author’s view, the tax law is aimed at
commercial transactions; and its application to non-commercial
transactions should be viewed with some skepticism. If income is
received in a non-commercial transaction, the absence of a
commercial source is not sufficient to preclude the tax law from
reaching that income and taxing it. But, if there are other
considerations favoring an exclusion, the non-commercial nature
of the transaction can be an added factor weighing in favor of the
exclusion. If a non-commercial personal attribute is voluntarily
placed in the commercial market, the tax law should address it. But
if a victim’s non-commercial personal attribute is involuntarily
converted to cash because of a tort, then that event can legitimately
be viewed as outside of the commercial zone in which the tax law
typically operates and that fact combined with other considerations
that favor exclusion may be enough to justify it.
Obviously, while the view that there is a non-commercial
zone in which the tax law does not always operate is a datum
favoring an exclusion of compensatory damages for a physical
injury, it disfavors allowing a deduction for an uncompensated
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personal injury. This disfavor of a deduction is a factor for not
allowing one, but it is not conclusive in itself or even entitled to
much weight. Deductions have been allowed in other areas for
non-commercial events such as costs incurred because of an illness
or losses from a casualty to or theft of personal use property.72
When there are competing considerations that warrant taking a
non-commercial event into account, the tax law appropriately has
done so. As we shall see, there are other stronger reasons for
denying the deduction. Let us first review the considerations
supporting an exclusion.
The tax law reflects a policy of allowing relief for
taxpayers whose property is involuntarily converted into cash.
Code section 1033 permits a deferral (or roll-over) of all or part of
the income realized on an involuntary conversion if property that is
similar or related in service or use to the converted property is
purchased within a specified period of time. In the case of a
physical injury, however, it is not feasible for the victim to
purchase a replacement for what was lost. So, the approach
adopted for property in Code section 1033 is not available for
physical injuries. The exclusion from income of physical injury
damages could be the relief that Congress adopted given that the
choice of a deferral through a roll-over is not readily available for
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I.R.C. §§ 213 and 165(c)(3).
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this type of involuntary conversion. It is doubtful that concern over
the involuntariness of the conversion of the victim’s personal
attribute is sufficient by itself to warrant granting an exclusion, but
that consideration can be added to others so that their cumulative
effect is sufficient to induce Congress to grant the exclusion.
Another consideration favoring exclusion is that taxing the
victim on compensatory damages might cause a dramatic increase
in the amount of damages awarded. Some of the added amount
may not be collectible if it exceeds insurance coverage. In any
event, Congress may not wish to have the tax laws be the engine
that drives damage awards to dizzying heights. Note that the
concern over higher damages award is not based on sympathy for
tortfeasors. An increase in damage awards would cause an increase
in insurance premiums that would be borne by much of the public.
Moreover, the insurers would take into account the possibility that
victims could be in high tax brackets, and that possibility would
further impact the premiums charged.
Another consideration is the appearance to the public that a
tax on such compensatory damages would have. It is difficult to
determine the dollar value of a lost personal attribute since
personal attributes are not bought and sold in the market place.73

73

The difficulty of valuing the loss incurred from an
uncompensated physical injury is one factor in not providing a
deduction. While that difficulty is not a sufficient obstacle by itself
37

Since the damaged or lost attribute cannot be replaced, dollars are
the only means of compensating the victim, and the proper dollar
substitute cannot be established with precise and scientific
accuracy. The dollar amount awarded is merely a rough estimate of
what will substitute for the loss that the victim suffered. The
compensation is intended to put the victim back in roughly the
same position he occupied before the accident, or as close to that
as dollars can accomplish. It would be unseemly, even rapacious,
for the government to take a portion of the funds that were given to
make

the

victim

whole

and

thereby

leave

the

victim

uncompensated for part of his loss. The government does not wish
to be seen as a cold-hearted creditor capitalizing on the misfortune
of others.
As noted above, if damage awards were made taxable, the
amount awarded might be increased to provide greater relief to the
victim. However, it is unlikely that additional amounts will be
awarded in all cases, and the amount of an additional award in a
specific case will not necessarily be sufficient to offset the tax that
the victim must pay.
But, is it not equally unseemly for the government to give
no deduction to a victim who is not compensated for her injury?
Since the victim has no dollar investment (i.e., basis) in the lost
to warrant denying a deduction, it is one consideration to be added
to others that weigh against allowing a deduction.
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attributes, there typically is nothing to deduct.74 The failure to
provide a deduction for that loss does not have the rapacious
character that depriving a victim of a significant portion of her
compensation has.75
A majority of the public likely would react adversely to the
government’s seizing any of a victim’s compensation even though
little or no objection has been raised to the government’s failure to
provide victims with a tax deduction. This difference in attitude
and perception is referred to as a “framing effect.”76 For example,
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There are instances in the Code where a taxpayer is allowed to
take a deduction beyond his investment. For example, the Code
allows a taxpayer to deduct the fair market value of some types of
property donated to charity. On account of this rule, a taxpayer
may deduct all or a portion of the unrealized appreciation of an
asset. See Treas. Reg. ' 1.170A-1(c) and I.R.C. ' 170(e). However,
this is clearly a subsidy provision intended to encourage charitable
giving. See Kahn, supra note 34, at 46-47. Another subsidy
provision is the percentage depletion rules that, in some cases,
allow a taxpayer to take a deduction greater than his investment.
See I.R.C. ' 611. Even Congress expressed its concern that the
percentage depletion provision does not contribute to the accurate
measurement of a taxpayer’s income by listing it as a tax
preference item under the alternative minimum tax system. I.R.C.
' 57(a)(1).
75
Note that the Code does provide a deduction for any medical
expenses that the injured taxpayer incurs. I.R.C. § 213.
76
See Edward Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing
Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the
Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797, 807811 (2005). Professor Zelinsky cites other commentators who have
noted the existence of a framing effect, and he cites experiments
that have demonstrated that that effect does exist. See also Edward
J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Framing and Taxation:
Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household Composition, 25
JOUR. OF ECON. PSYCHOLOGY 679 (2004) (available online at
www.sciencedirect.com).
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Professor Zelinsky has suggested that the “framing effect” may
explain why the publication of so-called Tax Expenditure Budgets
has had such little effect on the adoption or maintenance of tax
expenditures.77 It would seem that even if the view that exclusions
are the equivalent of a deduction were publicized, the public would
not regard them as interchangeable. This “framing effect” is a
factor in the existence of many of the nonparallel treatments of the
tax law.
The tax law does not exclude all compensatory damages for
personal injuries. A victim of defamation or discrimination
currently is taxed on the damages received for his injuries since he
did not incur a physical injury. Why has there not been a hue and
cry raised in opposition to the government’s taking a significant
portion of those damages?

The author believes that the

explanation is that the public’s depth of sympathy for a victim who
suffers a serious physical injury (such as a loss of a limb) is far
greater than it is for the victim of non-physical injuries. That is not
to say that there is no sympathy for victims who do not incur
physical injuries, but only that the depth of sympathy is far less.
Moreover, the compensatory damages received for non-physical
injuries are generally regarded as substitutes for lost income as
77

Id. at 823. For a critical view of the tax expenditure concept, see
Kahn, supra note 34. See also Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S.
Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical Review, 54 TAX
NOTES 1661 (1992).
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contrasted to a damaged or lost body part. The taking of even a
significant portion of those damages does not have the rapacious
character that does the taking of damages for physical injuries.
The cumulative effect of the several considerations
described above makes a compelling case for an exclusion.78 None
of those considerations apply to the granting of a deduction. But,
78

One problem with allowing the exclusion of compensatory
physical injury damages is that, in settling a dispute, the parties
may characterize as compensatory damages payments made for an
entirely different purpose (this general issue can arise around any
exclusion). For example, part of the agreed-upon payment could
represent punitive damages, which are included in income. I.R.C. '
104(a)(2). The wrong-doer generally has little at stake in whether
the damages are labeled compensatory or punitive and thus may be
willing to classify the entire amount as compensatory in exchange
for a lower overall payment. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at
95-96. It may be difficult to show that the payments were made for
another purpose, but if the amount paid is obviously excessive, the
Service and the courts will re-characterize the payment and include
some of it in income. See Robinson v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 34
(5th Cir. 1997).
The possibility of false characterization of the nature of a
payment is not limited to disguised punitive damage payments.
The entire settlement, or a portion thereof, could be made because
of the nuisance aspect of a claim, and so could be made to end a
dispute and the bad publicity generated by it. It is especially
difficult to identify that situation, but in rare cases, a court may
make that determination and include part of the payment in
income. See Amos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-329. This
case involved a photographer who was kicked during a basketball
game by Dennis Rodman, a professional basketball player. The
Tax Court had to determine whether the $200,000 settlement
between Rodman and the taxpayer was taxable to Amos or whether
it was excluded as compensation for a physical injury under Code
§ 104. This was an easy case for the Service to argue that a portion,
if not all, of the compensation paid to Amos should be taxable
since the settlement contract itself expressly provided that a
portion of the proceeds was for the taxpayer’s agreement to,
among other things, not defame Rodman or disclose the existence
of the agreement. Id.
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parallelism is a principle that does favor allowing a deduction, and
so what considerations negate that factor? To some extent, the noncommercial zone consideration disfavors the allowance of a
deduction, but not strongly so. Similarly, the administrative
difficulty in placing a dollar value on uncompensated personal
losses militates against allowing a deduction, but not conclusively.
The major reason that no deduction is allowed is that no dollar
investment was lost and the goal of parallelism is not a strong
enough consideration to promote a deduction when there are no
other factors that favor it. This suggests that parallelism is not a
major goal for those that write the tax laws and that it is not a
sufficient policy in itself to affect tax decisions. Nonparallel
treatment may offend those who like a more tidy system, but it has
been given little weight by tax policy makers, and, in the view of
the author, justifiably so. The framing effect is one reason that
exclusions and deductions have not been regarded as identical so
that different tax treatment has not offended many. Consider the
example of the refund of the overpayment of an income tax that
was discussed earlier in this article.79 The lack of parallel treatment
in that case is unlikely to offend more than a small minority of
persons. That suggests that while parallel treatment has an appeal
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See supra Section III of the article.
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in the abstract, it has little influence on the evaluation of specific
provisions.
C. Clark v. Commissioner
The third example of nonparallel treatment arises from a
tax case, rather than a tax provision. In fact, this is one area where,
if the Service were given a choice, it would likely opt to provide
for parallel treatment by denying an exclusion for the reimbursed
taxpayer.
Clark v. Commissioner80, a 1939 Board of Tax Appeals81
case, involved a couple that, based on the advice of tax counsel,
filed a joint return for their 1932 tax year. In 1934, the Clarks were
audited and the Service contended that, based on errors in the
return, the Clarks owed over $30,000 more in federal income
taxes. After discovering the error, the Clarks also learned that if
they had filed separate returns, rather than filing jointly, they
would have owed almost $20,000 less in income taxes; and they
were not permitted to change their filing status.
The tax counsel who prepared the Clarks’ return, admitting
the error, transferred to the Clarks an amount equal to the
overpayment. The Service contended that this payment was
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40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq. 1957-1 C.B. 4. The Service initially
nonacquiesced in Clark (1939-2 C.B. 45) but, eighteen years later,
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The current Tax Court was originally known as the United States
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income to the Clarks. The Clarks argued that the “payment
constituted compensation for damages or loss caused by the error
of tax counsel, and that [they] therefore realized no income from
its receipt in 1934.”82
One interesting aspect of this case is that, whichever way
the court ruled, the policy would fail in some manner the principle
of horizontal equity. As set out in a hypothetical by Professors
Klein, Bankman and Shaviro in their casebook83, assume we have
three taxpayers. One individual, A, hires a good tax preparer and
therefore does not overpay his income taxes. Another individual,
B, hires a bad preparer, and overpays by $10,000. Finally, a third
individual, C, hires a bad preparer and also overpays by $10,000.
However, five years later, C noticed the error and, like the Clark
case, the preparer agreed to reimburse C for the overpayment. If
the $10,000 payment is excluded from C’s income, then C will be
treated similarly to A, i.e., it would be as if C had received good
advice from the beginning. However, such treatment would fail
horizontal equity when we compare B and C. By excluding the
$10,000 payment, C and B are taxed equally even though C
received $10,000 more income.
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Clark, 40 B.T.A. 333, 335. The court held for the taxpayers. For
a thorough analysis of the Clark case concluding that it was
correctly decided by the Board of Tax Appeals, see Zelenak, supra
note 4.
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If we tax the payment to C, horizontal equity is met when
we compare B and C, but not when we compare C and A. Either C
must be overtaxed as compared to A or undertaxed as compared to
B. While discussing this hypothetical in their casebook, Professors
Klein, Bankman and Shaviro note: “We cannot avoid committing
one or the other of these two ‘errors’ (of the overall tax system, not
the decision-maker) given that [A] and [B] are not being taxed
correctly relative to each other.”84 This scenario illustrates why
horizontal equity often is not a useful tool for policy analysis. The
resolution of the question of equity requires a determination of the
party to whom the comparison is to be made. In the above case,
there is no reason to favor either A or B as the proper object of
comparison and yet equality cannot be obtained with both unless a
deduction were allowable for a tax overpayment. There are good
reasons not to allow a deduction for tax overpayments.85
The court in Clark held for the taxpayer,86 thereby
committing the “error” that Clark was undertaxed as compared to
others who overpaid but were not able to recover anything from
their preparer. This decision created nonparallel treatment for these
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Id. See also Zelenak, supra note 4, at 388-89.
See supra text accompanying notes 30 and 31 (hypothetical
involving taxpayer Y).
86
The court’s decision in Clark seems to rely on cases that were
later repudiated but the result in the case could be justified on a
different ground which may have lead to the Service’s eventual
acquiescence.
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types of expenditures. That is, the court provided an exclusion if
the taxpayer is reimbursed for their overpayment, but no deduction
is allowable if the taxpayer is not reimbursed.
The Service, although it did acquiesce to the Clark
decision,87 subsequently attempted to narrow the scope of the case
as much as possible. For example, in 1992, the Service published
Private Letter Ruling (PLR) 9211015. The ruling described a fact
pattern where, because of a CPA firm’s negligence, an investment
fund failed to qualify as a regulated investment company (RIC) for
certain tax years. This failure lead to the investment fund’s paying
higher federal income taxes as well as other penalties and interest.
The fund was reimbursed by the CPA’s insurer for those expenses.
The issue was whether this reimbursement was income to the
investment fund.
The

Service

described

the

issue

as

whether

the

reimbursement was a recovery of lost profits and therefore taxable
to the fund or a replacement of the fund’s capital which would not
be includible in income. As noted by the Service “[p]ayment by the
one causing a loss that does no more than restore a taxpayer to the
position he or she was in before the loss was incurred is not
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1957-1 C.B. 4. See also Rev. Rul. 57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 45
(excluding a reimbursement of tax overpayment caused by a tax
preparer’s error).
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includible in gross income because there is no economic gain.”88
The Service then concluded that this reimbursement should be
classified as a return of capital and ruled that the investment fund
would not have to include the amount in income.89
However, in 1997, the Service reversed its position. In a
new ruling, the Service specifically revoked its earlier ruling in
PLR 9211015.90 Attempting to distinguish Clark, the Service
stated:
The indemnity payment that Fund received as a
reimbursement for the additional federal income
taxes and associated penalties and interest it
incurred are distinguishable from the indemnity
payments in Clark…the preparers’ error in filing
returns or claiming refunds caused the taxpayer to
pay more than their minimum proper federal
income tax liabilities based on the underlying
transactions for the year in question. In this case,
however, the CPA firm’s error altered the
underlying entity status of Fund. Fund incurred the
minimum proper federal income liability as a
Subchapter C corporation during the period it did
not qualify as a RIC. The CPA firm’s
reimbursement… was not made to compensate
Fund for a tax liability in excess of Fund’s proper
federal tax liability for the tax years relating to the
firm’s negligence. Instead, the reimbursement was a
payment of Fund’s proper tax liability.91
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PLR 9211015.
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PLR 9743035. See also PLR 9833007.
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PLR 9743035. See Old Colony Trust Company v.
Commissioner, 279 US 716 (1929) and Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 for
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This reasoning is weak, at best. The Clarks also paid the
correct amount of liability according to their filing status; although
it is true that the accountant’s error in Clark did not change the
underlying structure of the Clark family. In the PLR, two adverse
parties determined that the accountant’s mistake caused the
taxpayer to overpay their federal tax liability. While qualifying as a
RIC may have required the taxpayer to incur expenses that it did
not pay on account of the mistake, that fact merely should have
reduced the size of the taxpayer’s damage and accordingly reduced
the amount of the accountant’s liability. If the parties neglected to
take any such additional expenses into account in setting the
amount to be paid, it nevertheless should not affect the tax
treatment of the payment by the CPA firm’s insurer because the
amount of damages was set by parties at arm’s length and should
be respected by the Service.
In the author’s opinion, the Clark reasoning should also
apply to the PLR facts. The accountant is simply repaying the
taxpayer for lost capital based on the accountant’s error.92 This
should be treated similarly to payments made for causing damage
to property, i.e., unless and until the accountant’s payment exceeds
the taxpayer’s “basis” in his tax payment (i.e., the amount that the
92

To the extent that the payment represented interest on the
accountant’s obligation or was a return of a previously deducted
item (such as the accountant’s fee) it would be taxable. Rev. Rul.
57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 23.
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taxpayer paid), the payment by the accountant should be treated
similarly to a return of capital and thus nontaxable. That is not to
say that the taxpayer actually has a “basis”. One can have a basis
only in tangible or intangible property. But, basis is comprised of
dollars that have been invested; and so the replacement of dollars
is equivalent to a replacement of basis, both of which represent a
return of capital.
Professor Zelenak maintains, in his article on Clark,93 that a
reimbursement of income tax liability can be excluded only to the
extent that the tax payment can be classified as a “loss.” He
maintains that otherwise the repayment is taxable under the Old
Colony94 doctrine. The author does not agree that the taxpayer’s
tax payment has to be classified as a loss in order for the
reimbursement to be excluded. In the author’s view, it is sufficient
that the party making the reimbursement (the accountant95 in the
letter ruling) made an error that caused the taxpayer to pay out
dollars that he would not have had to pay if the accountant had not
made an error. It is sufficient that there is a nexus between the
third party’s error and the amount of payment that was reimbursed.
It should not matter that the taxpayer actually owed the tax he paid;
the significant fact is that the third party’s error caused the
93

Zelenak, supra note 4.
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taxpayer to have a greater tax liability than he would have incurred
if the third party had not made the error.
Consider this example: B owes a fine to the state of X that
is due to be paid on a specified date. A fine is not a deductible
expense.96 B’s attorney, T, holds a sizeable amount of B’s funds in
a fiduciary account. B requests T to use some of those funds to pay
the fine, and T undertakes to make a timely payment to the state. T
fails to make the payment on time, and so B is fined an additional
$20,000 for not paying on time. The additional fine is not
deductible.97

B properly owes the additional fine to the state.

Because the additional fine was attributable to T’s error, T
reimburses B for the additional $20,000 fine that B incurred. The
fact that B was liable for the additional fine should not cause the
reimbursement to be income to B. The reimbursement is replacing
dollars that B would not have had to pay to the state if T had done
his job properly.
PLR 9728052 presents a variation on this theme. In that
ruling, the taxpayer had agreed upon a settlement with his former
wife to pay her an annual amount for a specified number of years.
The settlement agreement provided that if the wife died before the
payment period expired, the taxpayer would continue to make
payments to her estate. This provision disqualified the payments
96
97

I.R.C. § 162(f), and Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(p).
Id.
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made to the wife for alimony treatment and made them
nondeductible.98 The taxpayer agreed to this settlement on the
erroneous advice of his attorney that the payments to the wife
would be deductible. The taxpayer sought indemnification from
the attorney’s malpractice insurer for the additional taxes he
incurred, and will incur in the future, because of the disallowance
of the deduction that he had anticipated receiving. The Service
ruled that since the taxpayer properly owes the taxes in question,
any indemnification he receives from the attorney’s insurer will be
included in his income.
Presumably, the taxpayer would not have executed an
agreement providing for post mortem benefits to the wife if he had
been correctly advised as to the tax consequences of that provision.
However, the wife likely would have rejected an agreement
without that provision unless the amount of the annual payments
was increased. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine just
how much the attorney’s error cost the taxpayer since one can only
speculate as to what the terms of the final settlement would have
been. In determining the amount of the taxpayer’s damages, any
additional amounts that the taxpayer would have had to pay should
be offset against the additional tax liability he incurred. In the view
of the author, however, whatever figure the taxpayer and the
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I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D).
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attorney’s insurer agree upon, regardless of whether it reflects
offsetting costs that the taxpayer might have incurred, should be
accepted by the Service because it will be the product of an armslength agreement. There is no risk of collusion in this
circumstance, and the bona fides of such an agreement are beyond
question, since the insurer has no extrinsic motives (such as
silencing the bad publicity that a dispute would bring to the
attorney) for settling the issue.99
In his article about the Clark issue, Professor Zelenak also
discusses the question of how a tax reimbursement payment that is
made pursuant to a tax indemnity agreement should be treated, and
concludes that such payments should be taxed.100 While accepting
much of what Professor Zelenak said in that article, the author
comes to a different conclusion. A tax indemnity agreement is a
guarantee of the tax treatment that a taxpayer will have in a
transaction and an agreement to indemnify the taxpayer for any
additional taxes incurred if the actual tax treatment is different
from the one that was promised. A tax indemnity agreement can be
granted in several distinct circumstances. It can be given by a seller
to induce a buyer or investor to enter into a transaction. Or, a third
party, such as a broker or promoter, could provide a prospective
99

Even if the payment were made directly by the attorney, the
possibility of collusion or ulterior motive is not significant enough
to change the tax result.
100
Zelenak, supra note 4, at 397.
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buyer with a tax indemnity agreement for the same purpose.
Indeed, an insurance company that has no connection to the
investment could insure that the taxpayer will receive a specified
tax treatment.101 Since Professor Zelenak focuses on a seller’s
indemnification agreement, the author will discuss that situation
first.
The Service currently treats tax indemnification payments
that a taxpayer receives as income to the taxpayer, and Professor
Zelenak concluded that the Service is correct in doing so.102 He
argues that the additional tax that the taxpayer paid cannot be
characterized as a loss because that would permit “private parties
to manufacture a loss out of nothing with no regard to the actual
nature of the asset in question, through the simple means of
misrepresentation by the seller.”103 He points out that to exclude
the tax reimbursement from income is to permit the parties to
provide the investor with a tax-free return on his investment,
thereby providing a benefit to the seller or the investor or both that
they could not otherwise obtain. Before examining that contention,
let us focus on the nature of a tax reimbursement payment.
As previously discussed, when a taxpayer receives a
reimbursement from the person who caused the taxpayer to pay a
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Zelenak, supra note 4, at 397.
103
Id. at 398.
102

53

higher tax through that person’s error, the payment should be
excluded from the taxpayer’s income as a damage payment to
replace lost dollars. The situation is analogous to the receipt of
damages for injury to property where the amount received is
excluded from income to the extent it does not exceed the
taxpayer’s basis, albeit the taxpayer’s basis is reduced by the
reimbursement if the taxpayer still has the asset.104 But, a payment
received pursuant to a tax indemnification agreement is on quite a
different footing. Such a payment does not constitute damages paid
for causing an injury. Instead, the payment is made under a
contractual arrangement. How should that contractually mandated
payment be treated for tax purposes? Let us first consider the case
of a seller-provided indemnification, and then consider a third
party indemnification.
The payment that the taxpayer receives from the seller is
made pursuant to a guarantee of the seller that was designed to
induce the taxpayer to make the investment. In effect, the seller
became an insurer, and the payment to the taxpayer can be seen as
insurance proceeds. If a taxpayer who owned automobile insurance
has his personal use automobile destroyed in a storm, and if the
taxpayer does not qualify for a casualty deduction because of the
insurance coverage, the insurance proceeds that are paid to the
104

There is no meaningful reduction of the taxpayer’s basis if the
asset in question was destroyed or was stolen and never recovered.
54

taxpayer are excluded from his income to the extent of his basis in
the automobile.105 The “insurance” proceeds received under a tax
indemnity contract should be treated similarly - i.e., they should be
excluded from income to the extent they do not exceed the dollars
that were “lost” by the taxpayer because of the additional tax
payment.
Alternatively, the tax indemnity agreement can be viewed
as an agreement by the seller to reduce the purchase price in the
event that the tax treatment of the transaction is different from
what the parties anticipated. In the case of a seller-provided tax
indemnity, the reduction of purchase price characterization seems
to be a better view than the insurance analogy since that is the true
consequence of the seller’s refunding part of the purchase price to
the purchaser. The additional tax that the purchaser had to pay is
merely the measuring standard for the amount of purchase price to
be refunded.
Regardless of which characterization is chosen, if the
indemnification payment is excluded from the taxpayer’s income,
it will reduce the cost of the transaction to him, which will mean a
reduction of his basis or of his expenses.
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See supra note 39 and the text thereto. The payments will
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destroyed, the reduction of the taxpayer’s basis has no
significance.
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Consider this analogous situation. K wishes to purchase a
house as his personal residence, but deems the asking price to be
too high because he will have to make extensive repairs if he
purchases the house. The seller induces K to purchase the house by
guaranteeing that the repairs will not exceed $20,000. K purchases
the house, and makes the repairs which cost $35,000. The seller
then pays K $15,000 pursuant to the guarantee. K does not have
income because of the receipt of that payment. The payment is a
reduction of the cost of the house to K, and so reduces his basis.106
In his article,107 contrary to the analysis above, Professor
Zelenak makes a strong case for taxing tax indemnification
payments that are made by a seller. He illustrated the objectionable
feature of an exclusion from income by the following example.108
X wishes to sell its bond109 to F. The bond will pay $100 on
maturity. F will buy X’s bond for $100 only if it will provide F
with a 10% return after taxes. All of F’s income will be taxed at a
flat 20% rate.110 If the interest payable on the bond is taxable, X
could meet F’s demand by providing an annual payment of $12.50
on the bond, which would provide F with an after-tax return of
106

The reduction of basis may not be of any consequence because
of the exclusion from income provided by Code § 121 for a
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$10.111 X would thereby pay 12.5% on the bond, and F would net a
10% return after taxes.
Instead, X issues F a bond for $100 that pays F only $10
per year, but X guarantees that the interest payments will not be
included in F’s income. If the interest is taxed by the Service, X
will reimburse F for any tax he incurs. The interest F received is
taxed, and F pays a tax of $2 per year thereon. Pursuant to the
indemnification agreement, X pays F $2 per year. If the $2
indemnification payment that F receives is excluded from his
income, F will have his desired 10% after-tax return; but Professor
Zelenak states that the cost to X will be only $12 per year ($10
interest plus the $2 indemnification). So, instead of X’s paying
12.5% on the bond, X will pay only 12%.
If instead, the $2 indemnification payment to F were
taxable, X would have to pay F $2.50 to provide F with $2 after
taxes. In that case, X would pay the same 12.5% that X would have
paid if X had acknowledged from the beginning that the interest on
the bond would be taxable.
In fact, however, even if the tax indemnification payments
are excluded from income, X may have to pay more than 12% on
the bond. If excluded from income, each $2 indemnification
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payment made to F will reduce F’s basis in the bond.112 When the
bond matures (unless F dies before then so that the basis of the
bond will be stepped up under Code section 1014), F will
recognize gain on the difference between the $100 proceeds that F
will receive and F’s adjusted basis in the bond. Pursuant to the
indemnification agreement, X will then pay F the amount of tax
that F incurred on that gain. That additional payment by X will
increase the total amount it pays on the bond to constitute an
annualized rate of something more than 12% of the original $100
purchase price. This potential additional cost to X does not
eliminate the tax advantages of the arrangement, but it does reduce
them.
Note that the tax benefit created by the above-described
arrangement need not be captured exclusively by the seller. The
benefit could be divided between the parties by the seller’s paying
a slightly higher interest rate on the bond. That possibility
increases the risk that parties will enter into a collusive
arrangement to take advantage of this tax reduction.
What does this problem tell us about the question of
whether tax indemnification payments by sellers should be
excluded from income? Not all seller indemnification agreements
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Under a transactional analysis, the payment is a reduction of the
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text accompanying note 106.
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are vulnerable to this abuse. Does the fact that some agreements
will provide a tax benefit, and that some parties will make a tax
indemnification arrangement in bad faith to obtain a tax benefit,
mean that all seller-made tax indemnity payments should be taxed?
The answer to that question is in doubt. The problem, so
ably described by Professor Zelenak, shows that there is a strong
policy reason to tax such indemnification payments. While it might
be possible to distinguish potentially abusive indemnification
arrangements from those that are not, that would impose a great
burden on the Service to identify the different situations. The better
rule is to apply the same approach to all seller-made tax
indemnification agreements - either tax the payments or exclude
them.
On the other hand, the problem described by Professor
Zelenak, while a significant consideration, is only one of several
factors to be considered. There also exist strong reasons not to tax
the indemnification payments and to treat them as a reduction of
the purchaser’s basis - i.e., the transactional view that the
arrangement constitutes a reduction of the purchase price, and the
insurance analogy. Perhaps, the issue should be resolved on the
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basis of empirical studies to determine whether the potential abuse
of the arrangement actually occurs to a significant extent.113
Note that the possibility of abusive manipulation by parties
to obtain tax benefits is mitigated by the vulnerability of such
arrangements to be struck down as shams. The difficulty that the
Service would encounter in identifying and prosecuting those
arrangements that are shams renders that remedy of less practical
value. But, if the occurrences of sham transactions are rare, the
remedy of disregarding them may be adequate.
Let us now turn to consider a tax indemnity provision that
is made by a third party (a broker for example) rather than by a
seller.114 There seems to be no potential for abuse in that case, and
so the indemnification payments should be excluded from income.
113

It would be difficult to determine the extent to which sham
transactions are taking place because of the secretive nature of
such transactions. But, at the present time, it is not possible to
obtain any empirical information since the Service’s position that
tax indemnity payments are taxable has not been challenged.
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There are two types of parties who may be willing to make an
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and provide tax indemnity insurance (sometimes referred to as
transaction tax risk insurance). See Kylie D. Logue, The Problem
of Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, CITE. See
also Kenneth A. Geary, New Opportunities for Tax Lawyers:
Insuring Tax Transactions, 104 TAX NOTES 26 (2004). Professor
Logue briefly mentioned the tax treatment issue (both in terms of
whether the premiums are deductible and whether the proceeds are
excluded). Logue at n.86. Professor Logue did not resolve the
question of whether the receipt of insurance proceeds in such cases
will be income to the insured, and he characterized that as a
difficult issue. Id.
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In most cases, the payments will reduce the taxpayer’s basis or
reduce expenses the taxpayer incurred.
Return to the hypothetical above where a buyer was
induced to purchase a residence by a guarantee that necessary
repairs would not exceed $20,000. In the hypothetical, the
guarantee was made by the seller. Instead, change the facts so that
the guarantee was made by the real estate agent with whom the
house was listed. The repairs actually cost $35,000, and so the real
estate

agent

pays

the

buyer

$15,000

pursuant

to

the

indemnification agreement. In the author’s view, the payment will
not be included in the buyer’s income, but it will reduce his basis
in the house.
Consider the Tax Court’s decision in Freedom Newspapers,
Inc. v. Commissioner.115 In that case, the taxpayer was induced by
a broker to purchase four businesses even though the taxpayer did
not wish to own one of them. The broker convinced the taxpayer to
make the purchase by promising to sell the unwanted business or
to pay the taxpayer $100,000 if the broker were unable to make the
sale.

The broker was unable to make the sale, and so paid

$100,000 to the taxpayer per its guarantee. The court treated the
$100,000 payment as a reduction of the purchase price paid by the
taxpayer for the business, and so excluded it from income. While it
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is unusual for a payment by a third party to be treated as a
reduction of the purchase price paid to another, the broker was so
connected to the purchase of the business that the court deemed his
payment to the taxpayer as part of the overall purchase transaction.
This approach could well apply to the scenario concerning K’s
purchase of a residence described above so that K’s basis in the
house would be reduced by the $15,000 payment he received.
Returning to the tax indemnity payment, it seems that the
payment might reduce the taxpayer’s basis in an investment that
was the subject of the arrangement or it might reduce costs that the
taxpayer incurred in the program, but it would not be taxable to the
taxpayer when received. In short, it should be treated the same as
an insurance payment.116 The question is whether the payment
should be treated as a return of part of the taxes the taxpayer paid,
which would have no effect on the taxpayer’s basis in any
property, or whether it should be treated as a reduction of the
amount of the taxpayer’s investment or costs incurred in the
transaction that he was induced to undertake? The purpose of the
broker’s indemnity agreement was to induce the taxpayer to
engage in a transaction, and so the payment can be seen as a
reduction of the costs the taxpayer incurred in that transaction.
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A payment by an insurer pursuant to an insurance contract
should be given the same tax treatment – i.e., not income to the
insured.
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That approach would conform to the Tax Court’s decision in the
Freedom Newspapers case described above.117
An alternative characterization of the payment is to treat it
as a reduction of any fee the payor may have received from the
taxpayer in the transaction. If so, the payment would be income to
the taxpayer only to the extent that the taxpayer had previously
deducted the fee (that is, income under the tax benefit rule).118 This
characterization would be proper if the guarantee made by the
payor was a sham, and the parties knew from the outset that the
payment would be made.119 If the guarantee was bona fide (i.e., not
a sham), it is a close question which of the two possible
characterizations is better. In the author’s view, the better
characterization is to treat the guarantee as an insurance
arrangement, especially if it were possible for the amount subject
to the guarantee to exceed the payor’s fee.120
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(1976), aff’d per curiam by a divided court, 574 F. 2d 189 (1978).
118
I.R.C. § 111.
119
This is merely an application of the sham transaction doctrine.
120
Preferring the characterization of the indemnification payment
as an insurance payment rather than as a reduction of the broker’s
fee may appear to be inconsistent with the author’s preference for
the characterization of a seller’s indemnification as a reduction of
the purchase price rather than as insurance. However, the author
believes that the different circumstances of those two situations
warrant different characterizations.
In any event, if the broker’s fee is not deductible, it may
well be treated as part of the purchaser’s cost of the property. If so,
a characterization of the indemnification payment as a reduction of
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If the payment is treated as insurance proceeds, it would
seem to be a deductible expense of the payor, provided that the
guarantee met the ordinary and necessary standard of business
deductions.121 Would it be erroneous to allow the payor a
deduction and yet have no corresponding income to the taxpayer?
In the author’s view, that is not an error. An insurance company
that made a payment on a damage claim can deduct its payment
even though it is not income to the person who received the
payment.
In conclusion, reimbursements should be excluded from
income when they are paid for additional taxes that were incurred
because of the payor’s error regardless of whether the error was
made in preparing the tax return. If the reimbursement is made
pursuant to a tax indemnity agreement of a third party, it should be
excluded from income; but the reimbursement may reduce a
taxpayer’s costs in acquiring assets or engaging in a transaction. If
the reimbursement is made pursuant to a tax indemnity agreement
of a seller, it is a difficult question as to whether it should be taxed
because of the problems that Professor Zelenak described. In the
author’s view, unless empirical evidence demonstrates that the

the broker’s fee will reduce the purchaser’s basis, and thus will
have the same tax effect as would an insurance payment.
121
I.R.C. § 162(a).
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problem that Professor Zelenak describes is extensive, the
indemnification payments should be excluded.
D. Employee Business Expenses
Federal income tax deductions can be divided into several
categories. First, they can be either itemized or nonitemized
deductions. Nonitemized deductions are deducted from an
individual taxpayer’s gross income to determine the individual’s
adjusted gross income. In general, there are no limitations on the
amount

of

an

individual’s

nonitemized

dedutions.

Most

nonitemized deductions are those listed in Code section 62(a), but
a few nonitemized deductions are listed instead in other Code
sections.122 All deductions that are not nonitemized, other than the
deductions for personal exemptions, are itemized deductions.123
Itemized deductions can be deducted only if neither the
taxpayer nor the taxpayer’s spouse elect to use a standard
deduction.124 In addition, all but three types of itemized deductions
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For example, Code §§ 71(f)(1)(B) (excess alimony payments),
164(f) (self-employment taxes) and 165(h)(4)(A) (personal
casualty losses that do not exceed the taxpayer’s personal casualty
gains) are nonitemized deductions that are not listed in Code §
62(a).
123
I.R.C. § 63(d).
124
I.R.C. § 63(b), (c)(6)(A). The standard deduction is a specified
dollar amount allowable to individuals in lieu of their itemized
deductions. I.R.C. § 63(b), (c), (f). Thus, an individual can either
take his itemized deductions or a standard deduction, but cannot
take both. On the other hand, an individual can take all of his
nonitemized deductions even if he elects to use the standard
deduction.
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are subject to an overall limitation that applies if the individual’s
adjusted gross income exceeds a specified amount.125 This overall
limitation is scheduled to be phased out temporarily beginning in
the year 2006, but it is scheduled to come back in full force in
2011.126 In addition to the general limitations that apply, certain
itemized deductions have specific limitations that apply only to
that deduction.127
A subcategory of itemized deductions, referred to as
“miscellaneous itemized deductions,” is subjected to another
limitation.128 All itemized deductions that are not listed in Code
section 67(b) are miscellaneous itemized deductions.129 The total
of an individual’s miscellaneous itemized deductions for a taxable
year can be deducted only to the extent that the total exceeds 2% of
the individual’s adjusted gross income for that year.130 This 2% of
adjusted gross income floor is in addition to all other limitations
that apply to the deduction. In addition, miscellaneous itemized
125

I.R.C. § 68(a). Initially, the threshold specified amount was
$100,000, but it is adjusted annually for inflation. I.R.C. § 68(b).
For the year 2005, the threshold amount is $145,950. Rev. Proc.
2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970. The three itemized deductions that
are excluded from this overall limitation are medical expenses,
investment interest, and certain losses. I.R.C. § 68(c).
126
I.R.C. § 68(f), (g). Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38.
127
For example, medical expenses can be deducted only to the
extent that they exceed a percentage of the individual’s adjusted
gross income. I.R.C. § 213(a).
128
I.R.C. § 67(a).
129
I.R.C. § 67(b).
130
I.R.C. 67(a).
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deductions are not deductible at all when the taxpayer is subject to
the alternative minimum tax.131 If the alternative minimum tax
system is not amended, it is predicted that by 2010, one-third of the
total number of taxpayers will be taxed under the alternative
minimum tax system rather than the “regular” system.132
Subject to a few exceptions,133 unreimbursed business
expenses of an employee are itemized deductions.134 Since the
itemized deduction for employee business expenses is not listed in
Code section 67(b), it is a miscellaneous itemized deduction. On
the other hand, to the extent that an employee’s business expense is
reimbursed by the employer, the deduction for that expense is a
nonitemized deduction that is not subject to any limitations.135
Indeed, since the nonitemized deduction for the expense will wash
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I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i).
Gregg A. Esenwein, Congressional Service Report for
Congress, The Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals 6
(January 30, 2003).
133
Certain expenses connected with an employee’s claim based on
discrimination are nonitemized deductions. I.R.C. § 62(a)(19) [20].
Certain business expenses of qualified performing artists, a state
official, members of reserve components of the armed forces, and
up to $250 of specified expenses of eligible educators are
nonitemized deductions, and so are not subject to the limitations
that apply to itemized deductions. I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(B)-(E). The
provision for the deduction of a limited amount of educators’
expenses is scheduled to expire in 2006. I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(D) (as
amended by § 307(a) of the Working Families Relief Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-311, sec. 307(a), § 62, 118 Stat. 1166, 1179).
Employees can also take a nonitemized deduction for qualified
moving expenses. I.R.C. § 62(a)(15).
134
I.R.C. § 62(a)(1), (2).
135
Id.
132
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out the inclusion of the reimbursement in the employee’s gross
income, the Service simplifies the reporting of those items by
allowing the employee, instead of deducting the expense, simply to
exclude the reimbursement from income. This alternative of an
exclusion from income is allowed only if the employee is required
to account to the employer, and does so.136
Employee business expenses then are another example of
nonparallel treatment by the Code. Is there a justification for
treating employees whose business expenses are reimbursed by
their employer more favorably than employees who bear the
expense themselves? The difference can be nothing more than
formulaic – i.e., in some cases, it merely reflects the manner in
which the employer and employee have chosen to characterize
their arrangement. Take the example of a college professor, X,
who accepts a teaching visit at another college for an academic
year, consisting of nine months. X will return to his home school
when the nine-month period is finished. Since X is away from
home temporarily, his living expenses at the visiting school,
including his lodging, will constitute deductible business expenses
under Code section 162(a)(2). However, only one-half of his
expenses for meals are deductible.137 In negotiating his salary at
the visiting school, X requests and receives a larger salary to
136
137

Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(b)(1).
I.R.C. § 274(n).
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compensate for the extra living expenses he will incur. All of X’s
salary, including the added amount, is included in X’s gross
income. While X’s living expenses (including one-half of the cost
of his meals) are deductible, they are miscellaneous itemized
deductions; because of the limitations on those deductions, X will
obtain little or no benefit from them. However, if X does not seek a
higher salary and, instead, obtains an agreement from the visiting
school to reimburse X for all or part of his living expenses (or to
pay some of those expenses directly), all of the reimbursed
expenses, including 100% of the cost of his meals,138 will be
nonitemized deductions that are fully deductible. Alternatively, if
X accounts to the visiting school (his employer) for his reimbursed
expenses, he can simply exclude the reimbursement from his
income.139 Whatever may be the proper tax treatment of all
employee business expenses, there is no justification for having
dramatic differences in the tax treatment of employees based on
such a substantively meaningless distinction, especially when the
result can easily be manipulated by some taxpayers.140

138

Without the reimbursement, only 50% of the cost of the meals
would have been deductible as a miscellaneous itemized
deduction. Id. The 50% limitation would apply to the deduction
allowable to the school for its reimbursement of the employee’s
meal; but since the school will be a nonprofit organization,
deductions are of no consequence to it.
139
See supra note 136 and the text thereto.
140
For a numerical example illustrating the large tax difference,
see Kahn, supra note 3, at 21-25.
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In a prior article, the author criticized the Code’s
imposition of restrictions on employee business expenses,141 and
only a summary of some of that discussion will be repeated in this
piece.

Several

commentators,

including

the

author,

have

questioned whether there is a justification for imposing general
restrictions on itemized deductions.142 Regardless of whether the
current treatment of itemized and miscellaneous itemized
deductions is proper, unreimbursed employee expenses should not
be included in the list of those deductions.
Let us focus on the justifications offered for the
miscellaneous itemized deduction provision since that is the
principal restriction on deductibility and since those also seem to
be the justifications for any restrictions on itemized deductions.
Four justifications have been suggested:143 (1) Reducing
administrative burdens for the Service and the taxpayer for the
treatment of small amounts that do not warrant that time and

141

See Kahn, supra note 3, at 20-25.
Kahn, supra note 3, at 29-53; Robert J.Peroni, Reform in the
Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual Income Tax
System, 91 TAX NOTES 1415 (2001). See also Martin J. McMahon,
Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let
Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459,
493 (1993).
143
The first three of these justifications are suggested in Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1896, at 78-79 (Comm. Print 1987). The fourth is
suggested by some commentators. See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier,
Some Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys’
Fees and Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531, 533 (2000).
142
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expense, (2) Some of the included items have elements of personal
expenditures and would have been incurred even if no business
purpose had also been present, (3) Taxpayers make errors in
reporting itemized deductions, and (4) The government needs the
additional revenue that the imposition of the limitations will bring.
In a prior article, the author dealt with each of those purported
justifications and concluded that they do not justify the
restrictions.144
As to the first justification of administrative burden, while
the provision will ease the record-keeping burden of some
taxpayers, it will do little for prudent taxpayers who will retain
records of those expenses since they will not know until the end of
the year whether they will benefit from itemizing their
deductions.145 While the limitations on employee business
expenses will ease the Service’s auditing burden by removing
those items from many taxpayers’ returns, there are offsetting
auditing burdens created by the provision because some
individuals will seek classification as independent contractors,

144

Kahn, supra note 3, at 40-53.
See Peroni, supra note 142, at 1418. Contra Deborah H.
Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and
Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121, 167 n.235 (1989) (“The floor is
high enough that most taxpayers no longer keep records.”). If
Professor Schenk is correct, it is likely that some of those
taxpayers would have been entitled to itemized deductions if they
had kept records, and a system which discourages record-keeping
to the detriment of some taxpayers could be viewed as undesirable.
145
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rather than as employees, in order to escape the imposition of those
limitations. The Service will have to determine whether
independent contractor classification is proper, and may have to
litigate that issue.146
The second justification that many miscellaneous itemized
deductions have substantial personal elements is equally true of
business expenses of the self-employed and of reimbursed
employee expenses. One reason for preferring reimbursed
employee expenses is the assertion that the employer will
reimburse an employee for any legitimate business expense. But,
many employers do not reimburse employee expenses because
they do not wish to undertake the administrative burden of
maintaining a reimbursement plan; instead those employers pay
their employees a higher salary and leave the administration of the
costs to the employees.147 Another contention is that an employer
will oversee the legitimacy of expenses he reimburses, but that will
not apply to an employee of a corporation in which the employee
has a controlling interest (i.e., a closely held corporation).148
Moreover, many legitimate business expenses of self-employed
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See Kahn, supra note 3, at 41-43. See also Glen E. Coven,
Congress as Indian-Giver: “Phasing-Out” Tax Allowances Under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAX REV. 505, 527
(1987) (“[B]enefits must be offset by the complexity and
manipulation created by plans to avoid the new floor.”).
147
See Peroni, supra note 142, at 1422.
148
McMahon, supra note 142, at 493.
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individuals also have elements of personal enjoyment that
accompany them, but those expenses have not been subjected to
the restrictions applied to employee expenses.

Also, many

employers reimburse employee’s travel expenses by providing the
employee with a per diem allowance for which no accounting is
made to the employer, and yet those employee expenses are
nonitemized deductions.149
The third justification that taxpayers make errors in
reporting deductions is subject to three responses: (1) Errors are
made in many parts of a tax return, and there is no reason to single
out employee business expenses as being more prone to error than
other items; (2) Not everyone makes mistakes, and it is harsh to
punish the innocent for the errors of others; and (3) Creating a
floor for the deduction is not an adequate solution since those with
large amounts of such items that are properly deductible can still
make an error in taking an unwarranted deduction of a small item.
The fourth justification of raising revenue can apply to any
provision that raises tax costs, and revenue can be raised with
provisions that do not distinguish taxpayers on such a formulaic
basis.
In sum, the lack of parallel treatment (and resulting
violation of horizontal equity) is egregious in this case because the
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Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1T(e)(1).
73

difference between those who do and do not qualify for a
deduction can be so nominal as to make the distinction arbitrary
and opens the way to manipulation. While manipulation is not
available to all employees, it worsens the case for the restrictive
treatment of employee expenses that some employees can easily
avoid those restrictions while others cannot.
The question is whether the justifications for distinguishing
unreimbursed employee expenses outweigh the lack of parallel
treatment. In this case, the goal of parallelism is especially strong
given the manner in which the limitations can be so easily
circumvented by an arrangement between an employee and his
employer. On the other side, the justifications for different tax
treatment do not hold up well under scrutiny and can be considered
weak. On balance, this is a case where parallelism and horizontal
equity should prevail.150
E. Life Insurance Proceeds.
When an individual dies, no deduction is allowed for the
loss of that individual’s human capital. Yet, the receipt of the
proceeds of a life insurance policy typically is excluded from the
150

Another objection to the limitation on employee expense
deductions is that they do not apply to independent contractors,
whose business expenses are nonitemized deductions and fully
deductible. That difference in treatment raises an issue of
horitzontal equity unless a good reason exists for treating
independent contractors more favorably. In a prior article, the
author questioned whether the distinction is warranted. See Kahn,
supra note 3, at 62-63.
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recipient’s income under Code section 101(a)(1). There are several
exceptions to that exclusion. Interest received on the insurer’s
retention of the proceeds is taxable when distributed.151 The
interest element in amounts that are paid to beneficiaries in
installments is taxable.152 If the insurance contract had been
transferred for consideration prior to the insured’s death, the
“transfer for value” rule could cause the recognition of income in
the amount by which the proceeds exceed the consideration and
premiums previously paid by the distributee; but there are
circumstances in which the transfer for value rule does not
apply.153
The exclusion of the life insurance proceeds, while denying
a deduction for the loss of human capital on the death of an
uninsured individual, contravenes the principle of parallelism. The
context of this situation may seem familiar to the reader since the
circumstance is similar to the issue discussed in Part IV B of this
article dealing with damages received for a physical injury.
Especially when the physical injury results in death, the
circumstances have much in common. In both cases, the payments
(damage payments or life insurance proceeds) are not necessarily
151

I.R.C. § 101(c).
I.R.C. § 101(d).
153
I.R.C. § 101(a)(2). For example, the transfer for value rule does
not apply to transfers made to: a corporation of which the insured
is a shareholder or officer, a partnership in which the insured is a
partner, or a partner of the insured. I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(B).
152
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made to the estate of the decedent; they often are payable to
someone who survived the decedent. But they are both paid to
replace the human capital that was lost because of the decedent’s
death.154
The reasons for not allowing a deduction for the loss of
unreimbursed human capital that are discussed in Part IV B apply
equally to the instant situation and will not be repeated here.
However, the reasons for excluding damages for physical injuries
do not apply to the same extent to the receipt of life insurance
proceeds.
One might contend that the receipt of life insurance
proceeds is not as easily classified as an involuntary conversion
since a voluntary decision was made to purchase the insurance
contract.155 However, the death of the insured that triggered the
payment of the proceeds usually is involuntary. By analogy, the
receipt of insurance proceeds for the loss of property incurred from
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Damages for wrongful death can include payments for more
than the loss of human capital. For example, in some states,
damages can be ordered for the pain and suffering that the victim
incurred. Nevertheless, damages for the loss of human capital will
be a part of the award.
155
There are some commentators who argued that because life
insurance premiums are not deductible, the proceeds should be
excluded. See SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 9, at 106-07
(discussing, but not advocating, the argument). However, the
author believes that the nondeductability of premiums is
attributable to the consumption element of obtaining the risk
coverage that insurance provides, and has little, if any, effect on
the excludability of the proceeds.
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a casualty or theft is treated as an involuntary conversion. There
seems no reason to regard the receipt of life insurance proceeds
differently. The policy of treating involuntary conversions liberally
should apply to the receipt of life insurance proceeds. That
consideration alone is not sufficient to justify an exclusion, but it
lends support to that treatment if other considerations point in the
same direction.
The human capital that was lost by the insured’s death is
not bought and sold in commercial markets.156 The insurance
proceeds are designed to replace that capital with dollars since
monetary replacement is all that is available. There is a significant
non-commercial element to the insurance even though it involves
dollars. If the government were to tax the proceeds, or so much of
the proceeds as exceeded the premiums paid, it would be
preventing the insured from providing adequate substitution to his
beneficiaries of what they lost when he died. While there is some
unpleasant aspect to the government’s cashing in on the insured’s
death to the detriment of his family in many cases, it lacks the
rapacious appearance that the taxation of damages would

156

Obviously, people do exploit their human capital commercially.
For example, an employed person receives wages in return for the
use of his human capital. But, that is a type of leasing arrangement
as contrasted to a disposition of the capital.
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engender.157 This consideration has less force here then when
applied to the receipt of damages for physical injuries.
The case for excluding life insurance proceeds on
principled grounds is not as strong as it is in the case of physical
injury damages. It seems likely that the proceeds are excluded to
encourage the purchase of life insurance on the ground that having
families protected from destitution (or protecting families from
having to liquidate family-owned businesses) because of the loss
of an income producer is socially desirable, and so life insurance
should be encouraged by the tax law to implement that policy. In
addition, if the insurance proceeds were taxed, an insured
individual would need to purchase a much higher amount of
insurance to cover his needs. While Congress may wish to
encourage the purchase of life insurance coverage, it has no reason
to wish to increase the cost of that coverage.
The adoption of that policy of encouraging the acquisition
of life insurance is buttressed by the considerations noted above,
acknowledging that some are weaker here than in the case of
physical damages. However persuasive one does or does not find
that justification, it has no application to the question of allowing a
deduction for the death of an uninsured person. The lack of
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The lack of concern for this appearance is reflected in the
application of an estate tax on the death of an individual, but that
tax applies only to wealthy individuals.
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parallelism appears justified if one accepts the apparent rationale
for excluding the life insurance proceeds, but is not justified if one
concludes that the grounds for excluding the proceeds are
inadequate. In the latter case, it is not a question of applying
parallelism, but merely that there are not strong enough grounds
for providing an exclusion.
F. Meals and Lodging
Meals and lodging that are furnished to an employee, his
spouse and dependents, on the employer’s business premises for
the convenience of the employer, are excluded from the
employee’s income by Code section 119(a) if certain conditions
are satisfied.158 The “business premises” requirement has been
expanded to a small extent by the judicial and administrative
construction of that term, but the expansion is very narrow and
limited.159 Also, in certain circumstances, an employer’s furnishing
of meals to employees can be excluded as a de minimis fringe
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In the case of lodging, there is an additional requirement that
the employee have been required by his employer to accept the
lodging as a condition of his employment. For a discussion of the
application of this exclusion, see KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at
164-68.
159
“Business premises” must be either premises “where the
employee performs a significant portion of his duties or…where
the employer conducts a significant portion of his business.
Lindeman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 609, 615 (1973) Acq. See
KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at 165-66 for a discussion of when
the lodging can be physically separated from the employer’s
regular place of business because business is also conducted at the
lodging.
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benefit under Code section 132(e)(2). Yet, if not provided by the
employer or incurred in connection with business moving or
entertainment or travel away from home, the employee’s cost of
such meals and lodging is not deductible.160 The question is
whether that nonparallel treatment is justified.
It is easy to understand why an individual’s cost of meals
and lodging for himself and his immediate family generally are not
deductible because they constitute personal consumption. The
Code expressly provides, subject to specific exceptions, “no
deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family
expenses.”161 Even if that provision were omitted from the Code,
such expenses would not be deductible because they would not fit
within any Code provision granting a deduction. The denial of a
deduction for such expenses comports with a fundamental
principle of taxation that no deduction is allowable for personal
consumption.
While the reasons for excluding from an employee’s
income the meals and lodging provided by the employer for the
employer’s convenience are not set forth in any authoritative
statement, the likely purposes of the exclusion are reasonably
discernable. The exclusion initially was established by two
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Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5).
I.R.C. § 262(a).
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administrative rulings in 1919.162 One of those rulings exempted
from gross income the value of meals and lodging furnished to a
seaman while aboard ship. As to the exclusion of the lodging, it is
easy to see why the government agreed to exclude it from income.
A seaman has to live somewhere when he is not at sea, and often
that meant that the cost of lodging at sea duplicated an expense that
the seaman also incurred to maintain a home on land. The
duplicated or added expense of a berth at sea was attributable to
the requirements of the seaman’s work. In the case of many
seamen, the employer’s provision of lodging did not add to the
seaman’s wealth since it did not relieve him of the expense of
maintaining a home. Moreover, the berth provided by the employer
typically would be spartan; and since comparable quarters were not
sold on the market, it would be difficult to value.163
The circumstance in which the lodging exclusion was
applied to a seaman is one in which an expense paid by the
employee for that lodging would be deductible today. If the
seaman had to pay for his lodging, the expense would qualify
today under Code section 162(a)(2) as a deductible business travel
expense away from home. But, even in that case, the exclusion is a
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O.D. 265, 1 C.B. 71 (1919); O.D. 11, 1 C.B. 66 (1919).
Another early illustration of the rule was its application to the
Army’s provision of lodging quarters (or the commuted value of
the lodging) to officers. Jones v. United States, 60 Ct. Cls. 552
(1925).
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nonparallel provision because the seaman’s deduction would be an
employee business expense and so would be subject to the severe
limitations imposed on miscellaneous itemized deductions.164
Moreover, unlike the case of the seaman, many of the
circumstances to which the exclusion has been applied are ones in
which no deduction would have been allowable to the employee if
he had borne the cost of the meals and lodging.
Even from the time of its initiation in 1919, the exclusion
was not limited to circumstances where the lodging constituted a
double expense.

In the other 1919 ruling,165 cash paid to an

employee of the American Red Cross for maintenance expenses
was held to be excluded from income to the extent that the
employee’s actual maintenance expenses did not exceed the
amount he received. However, cash payments of that nature would
not qualify for Code section 119 today and would be included in
the employee’s income.166 There is still no requirement of a double
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See supra note 130 and accompanying text. In a prior article,
the author concluded that the limitations on the deduction of
employee business expenses are unwarranted. Kahn, supra note 3.
If the seaman were required by the employer to pay a specified
amount for his lodging then the proper treatment is to reduce the
seaman’s salary by the amount he is required to pay back to the
employer and to treat the seaman as having been furnished the
lodging. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b), and infra note 182.
165
OD. 11, supra note 162.
166
See Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977). While it is
clear that Congress intended to tax cash receipts for meals and
lodging, that distinction has been criticized as irrational. See
Adrian A. Kragen and Klonda Speer, IRC Section 119: Is
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expense in current law, and so one has to search elsewhere for a
rationale for the exclusion.
As to the seaman’s meals that his employer provided, there
was no double expense, and so once again we see that the double
expense justification does not explain the adoption of what
constitutes a much broader rule. We must look further for an
explanation.
One year after the promulgation of the two 1919 rulings,
Treasury amended its regulations to provide that meals and lodging
furnished to an employee for the convenience of the employer is
excluded from income.167 From that time on, the exclusion was
established, but it underwent many alterations over the years.168
On account of the confusion as to the application of the exclusion
and

of

Congressional

dissatisfaction

with

the

restrictive

construction that the government adopted, Congress enacted Code
section 119 as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.169
Unfortunately, the statutory codification of the exclusion did not

Convenience of the Employer A Valid Concept?, 29 HASTINGS L.J.
921 (1978).
167
Amendment to Article 33 of Regulation 45, Treas. Reg. 45,
art.33 (1920 ed.), T.D. 2992, 2 C.B. 76 (1920).
168
For a history of the tax law’s treatment of the exclusion, see
Kragen and Speer, supra note 148, at 922-927.
169
H.Rept. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 21d Sess., at A38-A39 (1954);
Kragen and Speer, supra note 166.
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dispel all of the confusion over its application, and questions
continued to be litigated and alterations made.170
What then is the rationale for the exclusion? Professor
Kragen and Ms. Speer stated:
The premise underlying exclusion in section 119 is
that the greater the employer’s control of the
employee’s enjoyment of the meals or lodging, the
less likely they will be considered as compensation
and the less directly will the employee be held to
have benefitted. If the employee is benefitted only
indirectly, the value of the accommodations
provided will be excluded from income, even
though some compensation factor is present.171
While there is no authoritative support for the proposition,
there is reason to believe that the tax law generally will not tax
benefits received by someone who obtains those benefits by being
the incidental beneficiary of actions taken by another for the
other’s own purposes other than a compensatory purpose. For
example, if an applicant for employment is invited by a
prospective employer to travel to the employer’s location for an
interview, and if the prospective employer reimburses the applicant
for his travel expenses, the reimbursement will be excluded from
the applicant’s income.172 It is in the prospective employer’s
economic interest to have the applicant come to it rather than to
170

Id. See also the student note, J.Patrick McDavitt, Dissection of
A Malignancy: The Convenience of the Employer Doctrine,” 44
NOTRE DAME L.R. 1104 (1969).
171
See Kragen and Speer, supra note 166.
172
Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963-1 C.B. 177. See infra Part IV G of the
article.
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send its agents to the applicant. The applicant benefits from being
provided travel to the interview, but the prospective employer did
not provide that travel in order to compensate the applicant. The
applicant can be viewed as an incidental beneficiary of a business
act of the prospective employer.173
When meals and lodging are provided by an employer for
its own business purposes, an employee’s benefit can be seen as
noncompensatory and incidental to the employer’s action. While,
in many cases, the parties are aware that the employee does benefit
financially from the arrangement, and so it can affect the
compensation paid to the employee and thereby has a
compensatory element, compensation for services is not the
primary motivating force.174
Another reason for the exclusion is the administrative
difficulty of arriving at a fair valuation of the benefits the
employee received. When property is received or given in kind, the
income tax law typically values it at the price that would be paid
by a willing buyer from a willing seller where both parties have
full knowledge of relevant information and neither is under a
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The treatment of the reimbursement of an applicant’s expense is
discussed in Part IV G of this article.
174
See Treas. Reg. 1.119-1(a)(2) (“[I]f the employer furnishes
meals to his employee for a substantial noncompensatory business
reason, the meals so furnished will be regarded as furnished for the
convenience of the employer, even though such meals are also
furnished for a compensatory reason.”)
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compulsion to buy or sell.175 Of course, property is bought and
sold in different markets (e.g., retail, wholesale, private sale), and
the geographic location of the market can alter the price. But, that
factor has not proved to cause difficulty in the tax law’s
determination of value. In some cases, the benefits received by the
employee are not ones that are sold on the market, and so valuation
becomes more speculative in that case. But, that is not always true,
and sometimes (for example, in the case of meals for restaurant
employees) the same items are sold to the public.176
But, the problem of determining the value of the
employee’s benefits is more difficult than merely determining the
market value of the items. One aspect of meals and lodging that
qualify for the exclusion is that the employee has little or no choice
as to whether to accept them. In the case of lodging, acceptance
must be a condition of the employee’s employment.177 So, while
the market puts one value on the benefit received, it may have a
much lower subjective value to the employee. While the tax law
does not ordinarily accommodate subjective differences,178 it
seems unrealistic to ignore them in this situation. Consider the
175

See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2).
See Kragen and Speer, supra note 166, at 949.
177
I.R.C. § 119(a)(2). While Code § 119 does not require that the
employee accept provided meals, practical considerations often
will mean that he has no realistic opportunity to eat elsewhere.
Time constraints often make the proffered meal the only one that is
feasible.
178
Cf. Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980).
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plight of a janitor who is employed by a luxury hotel in an isolated
area and is provided a room in the basement of the hotel for his
living quarters, a room that would not otherwise be rented to
clients of the hotel. If the location and elegance of the hotel is
taken into account, the room will have a much greater value than
the janitor could afford or would ever pay. But the room likely
does have a subjective value to the janitor that is significantly less
than its market value. The difficulty of establishing that subjective
value is a factor in allowing the exclusion and thereby avoiding
that problem.
Are those reasons adequate to justify the exclusion? In the
case of a double expenditure for lodging, it would seem so; but that
is not the typical application of the rule. The rule of exclusion
provides a great advantage to taxpayers who are employed in jobs
that require them to live on the business premises, and that
difference in treatment of employees violates the principle of
horizontal equity.179 Of course, the same can be said of all fringe
benefits that are excluded from income. But the value of meals and
lodging can be quite substantial, and so considerations of equity
take on greater weight. Professor Kragen and Ms. Speer concluded
that the exclusion is not justified and should be repealed; although
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The employee’s advantage is mitigated to the extent that the
benefit he receives is reflected in a reduction of the employee’s
salary.
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they did not believe that there is political support for repeal.180 In
the author’s view, the exclusion should be retained for the reasons
stated above, but should be modified to be more restricted in some
areas and more expansive in others.181
In any event, if the reasons for having the exclusion,
perhaps with modifications, are deemed adequate, as the author
believes them to be, there should be no concern that a deduction is
not allowed for the cost of such items when they are not provided
by the employer. There are good reasons not to allow a deduction,
and the valuation and incidental benefit rationales for the exclusion
do not apply to the situation where the employee pays for his
lodging and meals.182 While the exclusion does violate horizontal
equity by discriminating against employees whose jobs do not
require them to live on the business premises, those persons have a
greater choice as to where to live or eat, and so they are not in the
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Kragen and Speer, supra note 166, at 949.
Professors Kragen and Speer recommended modification
because they did not believe that repeal was feasible politically. Id.
While the scope of the exclusion should be narrowed in some
respects, it should be broadened in others. For example, the denial
of an exclusion for cash reimbursements is not warranted. Id.
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There is an exception, and properly so, if the employee is
charged a fixed amount for the meals and lodging, and is required
to pay it regardless of whether he accepts the benefit. Treas. Reg. §
1.119-1(a)(3), (b). In that case, the situation is substantively
identical to the situation where the employee is provided the meals
or lodging and is paid a lower salary. The additional salary which
must be returned to the employer is merely a bookkeeping item
and should be disregarded since it does not alter the substance of
the arrangement. See supra note 164.
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identical position of the tax-favored employee. Moreover, some of
an employee’s advantage from the exclusion will be lost to the
extent it causes a reduction of the employee’s salary; but that
reduction of the employee’s benefit may be offset by the benefit
the employer enjoys from paying lower wages, which violates the
horizontal equity principle as to the employers. It is a value
judgment as to whether the disparate treatment is so offensive as to
warrant repealing the exclusion, but the author does not deem it to
be so.183
G. Job Interview Expenses.
Treasury

Regulation

section

1.212-1(f)

states

that

“expenses such as those paid or incurred in seeking employment or
in placing oneself in a position to begin rendering personal services
for compensation” are not deductible under Code section 212. The
construction of that provision has had a checkered history,184 but it
finally has been construed to mean that expenses of seeking
employment in a trade or business in which the taxpayer is not
already actively engaged are not deductible; but expenses of
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Food and lodging are only one example of nonparallel treatment
provided by the Code in the employee benefit area. The two
largest, in terms of dollar amounts, examples are employer
provided health insurance and retirement benefits. In order to
determine whether such nonparallel treatment is justified, each
item must be examined separately to see if there are countervailing
considerations which outweigh the goal of parallelism.
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See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at 446-48, and the
discussion in Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55.
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seeking employment in the same trade or business in which the
taxpayer is already engaged (or was previously engaged if the
unemployment gap is not too great) is deductible as a business
expense under Code section 162.185 However, even when
deductible, since it will be an employee business expense, it will
be a miscellaneous itemized deduction that is subject to severe
limitations on the amount that can be deducted.186
The reason for denying a deduction for expenses of seeking
employment in a new trade or business is that the taxpayer is not
yet engaged in that trade, and so the expenditures cannot qualify as
business expenses. As to whether they could be treated as incurred
“for the production of income” within the meaning of Code section
212(1), they will not qualify for deduction under that provision
because they are capital expenditures (i.e., expenditures incurred in
an attempt to create a relationship that will produce future income).
Capital expenditures are not currently deductible.187 Even if such
expenses were held to be deductible, and they have not been, the
deduction would be a miscellaneous itemized deduction, which is
subject to severe limitations as to the amount that can be
deducted.188
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Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55.
Those limitations are discussed in Part IV D of the article.
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I.R.C. § 263.
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Those limitations are discussed in Part IV D of the article.
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In contrast to the treatment of unreimbursed expenses
incurred in seeking employment, consider the tax treatment of a
taxpayer who is reimbursed by a prospective employer for the cost
of traveling to the employer’s location, including living costs
incurred while at the location. In Revenue Ruling 63-77,189 the
Service held that the taxpayer can exclude such reimbursements
from his income. This exclusion is not parallel to the treatment of
unreimbursed expenses since the latter are either not deductible at
all or are deductible as miscellaneous itemized deductions subject
to severe limitations.
The justification for excluding the reimbursements was
briefly noted above in connection with the tax treatment of an
employer’s provision of meals and lodging to an employee.190 It is
in the business interests of the prospective employer to have the
employee travel to the prospective employer’s location so that the
employer can interview him. The applicant is performing an act for
the benefit of the prospective employer, and so the costs incurred
in that act should be borne by the prospective employer on whose
behalf they are incurred. In this light, note that the Service has
ruled that “[i]t is ... a well established position of the Internal
Revenue Service that reimbursements for expenses on behalf of
another in a nonemployment context are not includible in the
189
190

1963-1 C.B. 177.
See supra Part IV F of the article.
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taxpayer’s income.”191 Of course, the applicant also benefits from
making the trip to the employer’s location in that he obtains an
opportunity to receive a job offer, and he may enjoy the trip,
especially if the prospective employer is located in an interesting
or attractive city. But, the purpose of the prospective employer in
making the reimbursement is not to compensate the applicant; it is
made to pay the costs of actions for the prospective employer’s
benefit. The applicant can be seen as an incidental beneficiary of
the prospective employer’s expenditures, and should not be taxed
for the benefits he enjoyed as an incidental consequence of the
prospective employer’s business activity.
Another element of job interviewing expenses should be
noted. One problem with allowing full deductions for job
interviewing expenditures is the difficulty in determining whether
the applicant’s interest in the job is bona fide. If a full deduction
were allowed, a taxpayer might arrange an interview with a firm in
a resort town in order to qualify his travel for a deduction. While
that may also occur when the prospective employer reimburses the
applicant for his expenses, the difference in that latter case is that
an independent party made a judgment that the applicant has a
serious interest in the job; and the strength of that judgment is
evidenced by the fact that the prospective employer expended its
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Rev. Rul. 80-99, 1980-1 C.B. 10.
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own funds to bring the applicant to the interview. There is merit to
the government’s accepting the bona fides of a taxpayer’s action
where a third party has demonstrated its belief that the action is
business related.192
The lack of parallel treatment here is not sufficient to
warrant making any changes. There are good reasons not to allow a
deduction for unreimbursed expenses incurred in seeking a job in a
new trade or business. The question of whether deductible
expenses in interviewing for a job in the same trade or business
should be subjected to severe restrictions raises issues as to
whether those limitations are defensible at all, and, if so, whether
they are defensible in the context of employee business expenses.
The resolution of those issues is broader than the question of
parallelism and has little to do with the subject of this article.193
There are good reasons for excluding reimbursements from income
that have no application to unreimbursed expenses. Parallelism is
not a meaningful issue in this context.
V.

Conclusion
A proposal for the repeal or alteration of a specific tax

provision often will utilize the principle of parallelism or
horizontal equity to support that proposal. While those two
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The same substantiation argument could apply in other
situations where an exclusion is allowed.
193
For a discussion of those issues, see Kahn, supra note 3.
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principles are not irrelevant, they should have little weight and
often are utilized inappropriately. The application of those
principles rests initially on a determination that persons who are
given different tax treatments occupy essentially the same income
positions. The identification of the points of contact between two
taxpayers that are sufficient to make their income positions equal
invokes value judgments over which reasonable people can, and
often do, disagree. But, the source of the frailty of the utility of
those two principles lies deeper than the mere difficulty of
identifying those items that constitute their relevant points of
comparison.
Horizontal equity applies to two persons who are in very
similar income positions. Nonparallelism refers to providing
different tax treatment to circumstances that are essentially the
same. Two persons are rarely in identical circumstances, and two
circumstances that appear to be the same can have significant
differences. To resolve whether two persons or circumstances are
to be treated the same by the tax law, it is necessary to determine
whether the differences that exist are relevant for that purpose.
The problem is that even factual circumstances that are similar can
raise quite different tax policy considerations that lead to treating
them differently for tax purposes.
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For example, in the case of two persons who incurred a
similar loss for which one was reimbursed and one was not, an
obvious difference between them is that one was reimbursed. If the
tax excludes the reimbursement from income but denies a
deduction for the loss, does that violate horizontal equity? Given
that the exclusion of the reimbursement from income has the
identical tax consequence to allowing a deduction for the loss, it is
easy to leap to the conclusion that the tax treatment is equivalent to
allowing a deduction for reimbursed taxpayers while denying one
to unreimbursed taxpayers.
However, as shown in the text, the apparent equivalence of
an exclusion to a deduction is an illusion. The tax policy
considerations that arise in connection with the tax treatment of a
reimbursement can be quite different from the policies that arise
from the tax treatment of an unreimbursed loss. Those differences
in tax policy considerations turn the apparent identity of the two
situations into a mirage that vanishes under inspection. Even if the
similarity of the circumstances of the two taxpayers is deemed
sufficient to invoke the principle of horizontal equity, that principle
may be outweighed by other considerations that point in the
opposite direction. Putting it differently, horizontal equity is
merely one consideration or goal to be weighed together with other
relevant considerations.
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Each instance of different tax treatments must be examined
separately to determine whether the difference is warranted. As to
the tax provisions discussed in this article, the reader can see that
different tax treatment is warranted for most of those provisions,
but is not proper for some.194
Although the principles of parallelism and horizontal equity
often are proffered as justifications for a proposed change in the
tax law, the proponents typically attribute far more weight to those
principles then they deserve. Moreover, in the case of some
provisions, the principles are inapplicable because the apparent
equivalence of circumstances proves to be an illusion. It is for this
reason that the author’s title to this article refers to the “mirage of
equivalence.”
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This article has covered only a few instances of nonparallel
treatment in the Code, but there are many others (especially in the
employee fringe benefit area).
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